How did Reason lead to Revolution?

Supporting Questions

1. What was the Enlightenment and what were the Enlightenment writers’ views on human rights?

2. What were the social, economic and political problems that were pointed out by the Enlightenment writers?

3. What did Enlightenment writers say that would inspire others to think differently about their current social, political and economic condition?

4. How did the Age of Reason writers and speakers influence people to action and revolution?
# 10 Grade Enlightenment and Revolutions Inquiry

## How did Reason lead to Revolution?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inquiry Standard</th>
<th>Era7.2.WH.2: Analyze the social, economic and political ideas that influenced the 18th and 19th century revolutions.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Staging the Compelling Question</strong></td>
<td>Discuss the concept of inalienable rights as seen through the excerpts from the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen-1789 and John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government-1690 The Second Treatises of Civil Government.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Supporting Question 1

**What was the Enlightenment and what were the Enlightenment writers’ views on human rights?**

**Formative Performance Task**

Define Enlightenment and design a chart listing the major Enlightenment writers, their major works, a brief biography of where they were from, and their essential Enlightenment ideas expressed in their writings.

**Featured Sources**

- Source A: Enlightenment 1685-1815
- Source B: What Was the Enlightenment?
- Source C: The Enlightenment and Human Rights
- Source D: Famous People of the Enlightenment

### Supporting Question 2

**What were the social, economic and political problems that were pointed out by the Enlightenment writers?**

**Formative Performance Task**

Match major Enlightenment writers with the social, economic and political problems pointed out in their writings.

**Featured Sources**

- Source A: John Locke: Excerpts from the Second Treatise of Government
- Source B: Excerpts from The Spirit of the Laws by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu
- Source C: Excerpts from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith

### Supporting Question 3

**What did Enlightenment writers say that would inspire others to think differently about their current social, political and economic condition?**

**Formative Performance Task**

In a short essay, summarize what the Enlightenment writers said in their writings and suggest what might inspire others to think differently about their current condition socially, politically and economically.

**Featured Sources**

- Source A: John Locke: Excerpts from the Second Treatise of Government
- Source B: Excerpts from The Spirit of the Laws by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu
- Source C: Excerpts from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith

### Supporting Question 4

**How did the Age of Reason writers and speakers influence people to action and revolution?**

**Formative Performance Task**

Develop a claim which is supported by evidence from various documents, that demonstrates how the Age of Reason writers and speakers inspired people to action and revolution.

**Featured Sources**

- Source A: Selected Excerpts from Common Sense by Thomas Paine
- Source B: Patrick Henry: “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death”

## ARGUMENT

How did Reason lead to Revolution? Construct an argument that addresses the compelling question using specific claims and relevant evidence from historical sources while acknowledging competing views.

**EXTENSION**

Express these arguments in a perspective-taking exercise using snapchat, topix.com, twitter, or other social media.
| Taking Informed Action | UNDERSTAND  
Investigate the current difficulties between police and minority groups in the Black Lives Matter socio-economic political revolution currently underway in the United States.  
ASSESS  
Examine the extent to which this current attempt at revolution is being successful and state one's personal stance on how this issue should be resolved.  
ACTION  
Write a letter to the editor of the local or state newspaper comparing the ideas as expressed by the Age of Reason writers and the views as expressed by the Black Lives Matter movement and how these issues should be resolved peacefully and respectfully as outlined by Enlightenment writers rather than through a violent revolution. |
Overview

Inquiry Description

How did the Age of Reason writers influence the people of the 18th century to think differently about themselves and the world around them? How did their writings motivate people to take action to fight for their basic human inalienable rights and even launch violent revolutions for social and political freedoms to achieve it in the 18th century? Do their writings affect us today? If so, how do those writings affect us today? Are there struggles today that can be connected to those revolutions of the past? How much of a role do their writings play in our efforts today to insure equal rights for everyone? Do equal rights really exist in America? If not, where are the inequalities in our society today? These are but some of the questions this inquiry attempts to have young scholars to think about and to try to answer through a detailed study of selected writings of the Age of Reason. Having researched, analyzed and thought about what these writers said, scholars should then be able to have a scholarly compelling argument using the primary documents of that period, to answer the compelling question, “How did Reason lead to Revolution?” Of course, this inquiry should be done after scholar learning of the Enlightenment, the American and French Revolutions and is intended to encourage scholars to think critically how these events are linked together.

Finally, since connecting the past to current events is essential for scholars to feel and understand history, it is of utmost importance to find a struggle from our present times to associate this inquiry to. One struggle for human inalienable rights at the present time in America is the Black Lives Matter movement. Being aware of this movement due to the intensive media coverage of their protests across the country, scholars will look at this movement and think about how their arguments of inequalities can be compared and contrasted to the arguments for equality and inalienable rights encouraged by Enlightenment writers and fought for by participants of the American and French Revolutions. After having done that, this inquiry leads scholars to take informed action by writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper encouraging peaceful rather than violent protest from the Black Lives Matter supporters to resolve their complaints. This whole inquiry should take around 12 class days of instruction time to completely close read the documents and play out the events scheduled as formative and summative performance tasks.

Structure

This inquiry begins with the compelling question of "How did Reason lead to Revolution?" but the compelling argument that scholars must present cannot come without first looking at primary documents of what inalienable rights are as seen through the writers of the Enlightenment. After discussing the concepts presented by these documents, scholars must define Enlightenment and express what the writers of the Enlightenment views were, of human rights in the first supporting question in the form of a chart. After accomplishing this task, scholars then must take the wealth of information provided in the next two supporting questions (the same sources for both questions) and first match them with the social, political, and economic problems they pointed out in their writings, summarize what the Enlightenment writers said in their writings, and finally, suggest what might inspire others to think differently about their current condition socially, politically and economically. In the last supporting question, scholars will develop a claim supported by evidence that demonstrates how the Age of Reason writers and speakers inspired people to action and revolution. After all of this thinking, analyzing, evaluating, and connecting all of the pieces of this compelling question material, scholars will answer the summative performance task of constructing an argument that addresses the compelling question while acknowledging competing views that would conflict with what these young scholars have arrived at as the answer to the compelling question. Finally, young scholars must take informed action. While this can be done in a number of ways, it is suggested that it be done in the form of a formal letter to the editor of a newspaper connecting the Black Lives Matter movement with the arguments made by Enlightenment writers and encouraging the followers of the movement to make their voices known through the actions of peaceful methods rather than through violent revolution.
Staging the Compelling Question

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Staging the compelling question

The first day of instruction on this inquiry needs to be spent evaluating the concept of inalienable rights through class discussion among the young scholars and what their definition of it is. Through discussion, the teacher/performance coach can bring out more than "just rights given by God that man can not take away" to the point of the much deeper meanings on inalienable. The teacher/performance coach can then enter into what the young scholars think are inalienable rights as well as deep discussion what those rights are and how they affect our lives on a daily basis. After much group discussion (small group or large group), the teacher/performance coach can introduce the following sources for the young scholars to see what the Enlightenment writers said were inalienable rights. The teacher/performance coach can then discuss with the young scholars if there are rights needed in those days that today we take for granted and what those rights may be. This should take one to two days of instruction to go through this piece of the inquiry. See the following documents as well as the sources which are a part of this inquiry.

The Two Treatises of Government-1690 The Second Treatise of Civil Government Summary: "In the late 1600s, the concept of 'government' meant one thing - monarchy. The idea that individuals were all equal - or at least, had an equal claim to rights and freedom - was a fairly alien one. In 1689, however, a book appeared that laid out a contrary theory, one which claimed exactly that - and started the world towards revolution and what we today call 'democracy.' That book, *Two Treatises on Government*, a work of political philosophy intended to push forward the ideas of contract theory and natural rights was written by a person who probably would've been somewhat shocked by what his ideas helped create, a century later -- John Locke.

Locke's major work was *Two Treatises on Government*, which was published anonymously in 1689. It's important to remember when Locke was writing these ideas; just a year before his book came out, the nation was convulsed by the Glorious Revolution, where the king, James II, was overthrown (at least in part because he was Catholic). So, while the power of the monarchy was unquestioned, the idea that common people could have some degree of control over the government was gaining strength.

On the subject of rights, Locke was decades ahead of his time. Locke claimed that there were natural rights, or entitlements human beings had merely because they were human, rights that no one could take away or rightfully eliminate. There were essentially three: life (each person effectively 'owns' him/herself), liberty (your right to do, more or less, what you want with that life) and property."

[http://study.com/academy/lesson/two-treatises-of-g-.](http://study.com/academy/lesson/two-treatises-of-g-.) Used with permission by Anne from the Study.com Team

The American Declaration of Independence Summary: "As the first formal statement by a nation's people asserting their right to choose their own government, the Declaration of Independence became a significant landmark in the history of democracy. In addition to its importance in the fate of the fledgling American nation, it also exerted a tremendous influence outside the United States, most memorably in France during the French Revolution. Together with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence can be counted as one of the three essential founding documents of the United States government."

[http://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/](http://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/). Used with permission per the website
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen--1789 Summary: "The document, The Declaration of the Rights of Man, is one that is very important to the French way of living. This document gives the natural rights of man and what they can and cannot do. In this, it is very similar to the Declaration of Independence."
written by Thomas Jefferson. This document was written at the time of the French Revolution and the writing of this was the marker of the resistance against the monarchy. *The Declarations of the Rights of Man* states the natural rights of man, as in the rights that cannot be taken away by anyone. However, these rights are limited to the people of the white color or those of the age of 25 years old. As bad as that sounds, it was a start to a new beginning. The French people, like the American people during our Revolution, felt that this was gleam of hope they needed to carry on."

[https://ccalawh.wikispaces.com/French+Revolution](https://ccalawh.wikispaces.com/French+Revolution)

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Excerpt

Chapter II, Sections 4-5:
“To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.”

Chapter IV, Section 23:
“This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it.”

Source:
https://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/367/1...

Public Domain Document
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. — Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world."

Source:
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/

Public Domain Document
"Approved by the National Assembly of France, August 26, 1789

The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may thus be more respected, and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the happiness of all. Therefore the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of man and of the citizen:

Articles:

1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good.

2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.

3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.

4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law.

5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law.

6. Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents.

7. No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law. Any one soliciting, transmitting, executing, or causing to be executed, any arbitrary order, shall be punished. But any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without delay, as resistance constitutes an offense.

8. The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one shall suffer punishment except it be legally inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the commission of the offense.

9. As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely repressed by law.

10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this
freedom as shall be defined by law.

12. The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be intrusted.

13. A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public forces and for the cost of administration. This should be equitably distributed among all the citizens in proportion to their means.

14. All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what uses it is put; and to fix the proportion, the mode of assessment and of collection and the duration of the taxes.

15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his administration.

16. A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all.

17. Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.”

Source:
[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.a.](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.a.)

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Supporting Question 1

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**Featured Sources**

- **Source A**: Enlightenment 1685-1815 from history.com
- **Source B**: What Was the Enlightenment? from livescience.com
- **Source C**: The Enlightenment and Human Rights from chnm.gmu.edu
- **Source D**: Famous People of the Enlightenment from biography.com

In order to begin a compelling argument to answer the compelling question, young scholars first must discover what the Enlightenment is, define it, and then express what their views were on human rights. This supporting question will take a full class period and maybe 1/2 of another day.

**Formative Performance Task**

Young scholars will define Enlightenment from the various sources provided with this question, and then design a chart which horizontally and vertically lists the major Enlightenment writers, their major works, listing where they were from, and any famous quotes or ideas expressed through their writings.
THE ENLIGHTENMENT:

"European politics, philosophy, science and communications were radically reoriented during the course of the “long 18th century” (1685-1815) as part of a movement referred to by its participants as the Age of Reason, or simply the Enlightenment. Enlightenment thinkers in Britain, in France and throughout Europe questioned traditional authority and embraced the notion that humanity could be improved through rational change. The Enlightenment produced numerous books, essays, inventions, scientific discoveries, laws, wars and revolutions. The American and French Revolutions were directly inspired by Enlightenment ideals and respectively marked the peak of its influence and the beginning of its decline. The Enlightenment ultimately gave way to 19th-century Romanticism.

THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT: 1685-1730

The Enlightenment’s important 17th-century precursors included the Englishmen Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, the Frenchman Renee Descartes and the key natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution, including Galileo, Kepler and Leibniz. Its roots are usually traced to 1680s England, where in the span of three years Isaac Newton published his “Principia Mathematica” (1686) and John Locke his “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” (1689)—two works that provided the scientific, mathematical and philosophical toolkit for the Enlightenment’s major advances.

Did You Know: In his essay "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784), the German philosopher Immanuel Kant summed up the era’s motto in the following terms: "Dare to know! Have courage to use your own reason!"

Locke argued that human nature was mutable and that knowledge was gained through accumulated experience rather than by accessing some sort of outside truth. Newton’s calculus and optical theories provided the powerful Enlightenment metaphors for precisely measured change and illumination.

There was no single, unified Enlightenment. Instead, it is possible to speak of the French Enlightenment, the Scottish Enlightenment and the English, German, Swiss or American Enlightenment. Individual Enlightenment thinkers often had very different approaches. Locke differed from Hume, Rousseau from Voltaire, Thomas Jefferson from Frederick the Great. Their differences and disagreements, though, emerged out of the common Enlightenment themes of rational questioning and belief in progress through dialogue.

THE HIGH ENLIGHTENMENT: 1730-1780

Centered on the dialogues and publications of the French “philosophes” (Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Buffon and Diderot), the High Enlightenment might best be summed up by one historian’s summary of Voltaire’s “Philosophical Dictionary”: “a chaos of clear ideas.” Foremost among these was the notion that everything in the universe could be rationally demystified and cataloged. The signature publication of the period was Diderot’s “Encyclopédie” (1751-77), which brought together leading authors to produce an ambitious compilation of human knowledge.

It was an age of enlightened despots like Frederick the Great, who unified, rationalized and modernized Prussia in between brutal multi-year wars with Austria, and of enlightened would-be revolutionaries like Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, whose “Declaration of Independence” (1776) framed the American Revolution in terms taken from of Locke’s essays.

It was also a time of religious (and anti-religious) innovation, as Christians sought to reposition their faith along rational lines and deists and materialists argued that the universe seemed to determine its own course without God’s intervention. Secret societies—the Freemasons, the Bavarian Illuminati, the Rosicrucians—flourished, offering European men (and a few women) new modes of fellowship, esoteric ritual and mutual
assistance. Coffeehouses, newspapers and literary salons emerged as new venues for ideas to circulate.

THE LATE ENLIGHTENMENT AND BEYOND: 1780-1815
The French Revolution of 1789 was the culmination of the High Enlightenment vision of throwing out the old authorities to remake society along rational lines, but it devolved into bloody terror that showed the limits of its own ideas and led, a decade later, to the rise of Napoleon. Still, its goal of egalitarianism attracted the admiration of the early feminist Mary Wollstonecraft and inspired both the Haitian war of independence and the radical racial inclusivism of Paraguay’s first post-independence government.

Enlightened rationality gave way to the wildness of Romanticism, but 19th-century Liberalism and Classicism—not to mention 20th-century Modernism—all owe a heavy debt to the thinkers of the Enlightenment.”

Source:
Article Title: Enlightenment; Author: History.com Staff; Website Name: History.com; Year Published: 2009

URL: http://www.history.com/topics/enlightenment

Access Date: 1/11/17; Publisher: A+E Networks

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Excerpt from What Was the Enlightenment? by Jessie Szalay, Live Science Contributor

July 7, 2016 11:56pm ET

"The Enlightenment, also known as the Age of Reason, was a philosophical movement that took place primarily in Europe and, later, in North America, during the late 17th and early 18th century. Its participants thought they were illuminating human intellect and culture after the "dark" Middle Ages. Characteristics of the Enlightenment include the rise of concepts such as reason, liberty and the scientific method. Enlightenment philosophy was skeptical of religion — especially the powerful Catholic Church — monarchies and hereditary aristocracy. Enlightenment philosophy was influential in ushering in the French and American Revolutions and constitutions.

Historians disagree on precisely when the Enlightenment began, though most agree that the Enlightenment’s origins are tied to the Scientific Revolution in the 1600s, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Enlightenment culminated in the French Revolution (1789-1799) and was followed by the Romantic period.

Major figures of the Enlightenment include Voltaire, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Isaac Newton and Thomas Jefferson."

"Philosophical Concepts

During the Enlightenment, there was more emphasis on scientific methods, secularization of learning, religious tolerance, universal education, individual liberty, reason, progress and the separation of church and state," said Abernethy. Some key Enlightenment concepts are:

Reason: Enlightenment philosophers believed that rational thought could lead to human improvement and was the most legitimate mode of thinking. They saw the ability to reason as the most significant and valuable human capacity, according to PBS. Reason could help humans break free from ignorance and irrationality, and learning to think reasonably could teach humans to act reasonably, as well. Enlightenment philosophers saw reason as having an equalizing effect on humanity, because everyone’s thoughts and behavior would be guided by reason.

Enlightenment intellectuals thought that all human endeavors should aim to increase knowledge and reason, rather than elicit emotional responses. They advocated for universal education and secularized learning, said Abernethy.

Skepticism: Rather than being content with blind faith, Enlightenment thinkers wanted proof that something was true. They tested popular notions with scientifically controlled experiments and personal experience, though skepticism of one’s own senses was another factor in Enlightenment thought, and caused complicated philosophical conundrums, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Enlightenment intellectuals were skeptical of the divine right of kings and monarchies in general, scientific claims about the natural world, the nature of reality and religious doctrine. "Theologians sought to reform their faith during the Enlightenment while maintaining a true faith in God," said Abernethy. The deist movement became popular during the Enlightenment. Deism holds that God exists but does not intervene on Earth. The universe proceeds according to natural, scientifically based laws. Several of America’s Founding Fathers were deists, including Thomas Jefferson.

Religious tolerance: Though skeptical of religious institutions, many Enlightenment thinkers believed that people should be free to worship as they wished. "The intellectuals of the Enlightenment vigorously sought to
restrict the political power of organized religion in an effort to curtail the outbreak of intolerant religious wars," said Abernethy.
Liberty: The Enlightenment tolerance of religion is related to the movement's emphasis on personal liberty. This concept holds that God and/or nature gave all humans basic rights and humans should be free to act without oppressive restriction. "These philosophers emphasized that government had no authority over an individual's conscience," Abernethy explained. "Individuals had rights, all men were equal and legitimate political power is based on the consent of the people and is obligated to be representative of the people's will."

Progress: The centuries before the Enlightenment were characterized by rapid changes, from the discoveries of the Scientific Revolution to the exploration of the world and the advancement in art technique during the Renaissance. Largely because of this, Enlightenment thinkers believed that the human condition was improving over time. Philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith, both Scotsmen, tied Enlightenment ideals to politics, economic policies and more, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Empiricism vs. rationalism: Empiricism is associated with British Enlightenment philosophers, including John Locke, George Berkeley and Hume. Empiricists argued that all human knowledge comes through the senses and sensory experiences. Rationalists, who lived primarily in continental Europe, argued that senses were untrustworthy and knowledge came from the mind, through conceiving of or intuiting ideas, according to Loyola University New Orleans.

Toward the end of the period, philosophers began to consider exactly what they meant by the term "enlightenment." German philosopher Immanuel Kant offered this definition in his essay "What Is Enlightenment?:

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage [many interpret nonage as "immaturity"]. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance ... Dare to know! Have the courage to use your own understanding," is therefore the motto of the enlightenment.

Major Figures

Abernethy discussed the following men who made significant contributions to the Enlightenment:

John Comenius (1592-1670) was a Czech intellectual who espoused universal education and practical instruction. He was instrumental in introducing pictorial textbooks written in the vernacular of the student rather than Latin. He advocated for lifelong learning and the development of logical thinking as opposed to memorization by rote. He wanted education to be given to women and impoverished children.

The Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a prodigious intellectual who laid the foundation for international law based on the concept of natural law. He was one of the pioneers in putting forth the idea of a society of states governed not by force and warfare but by laws and mutual agreement to enforce those laws. He also espoused the idea of religious tolerance.

Englishmen who were influential in the Enlightenment include Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704). Hobbes championed absolutism for the sovereign but he believed in the right of the individual and the equality of all men. He stated that political communities should be based on a "social contract" meaning individuals consent either explicitly or tacitly to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler (or to the decision of the majority) in exchange for the protection of their remaining rights. Locke promoted the opposite type of government, which was a representative government.

The French Philosophes (philosophers) took the Enlightenment to new heights. Charles-Louis de Secondat, better known as the Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), developed the work of John Locke and espoused the concept of the separation of power by creating divisions in government. François-Marie Arouet (1694-1778), better known as Voltaire, was a prolific writer who used satire and criticism to incite social and political change. He wrote attacks on the Catholic Church and exposed injustices. He promoted the concepts of freedom of religion, freedom of expression and the separation of church and state. His writings were popular and reached many readers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau(1712-1778) wrote the book "The Social Contract," in which he championed for a form of government based on small, direct democracy, which openly signifies the will of the population.
Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was not as interested in inciting revolution but wanted to collect and disseminate
Enlightenment knowledge. He embarked on a mammoth project to create the "Encyclopaedia, or a Systemic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Crafts." Many writers contributed to the 35-volume work, which as edited by Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. The "Encyclopaedia" would incorporate all of the world's knowledge and spread it to other countries all over the world.

David Hume (1711-1776) was a Scottish philosopher who gained fame as an essayist, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He was a highly influential empiricist who argued that humans were a bundle of sensations with no true selves (this is called the Bundle Theory) and that ethics were based on emotion rather than moral principles.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher central to the Enlightenment. He synthesized rationalism and empiricism through his theories about human autonomy and set the stage for later philosophical movements, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Adam Smith (1723-1790), a close friend of Hume, was a Scottish philosopher and economist most famous for his theory of the "invisible hand of the market," according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. His book "The Wealth of Nations" laid the foundation for free market economics.

Isaac Newton (1642-1727) was an English mathematician and physicist who laid the foundation for classical mechanics and calculus. Newton developed the laws of motion and universal gravitation, which led to improvements in understanding the Copernican heliocentric universe, according to the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences.

Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), an American Founding Father, was heavily influenced by Enlightenment philosophy and spent several years in France. He wrote the Declaration of Independence, which stressed Enlightenment ideas such as liberty, fundamental human rights and equality (though not for slaves), according to the Thomas Jefferson Foundation."

"How the Enlightenment changed the world

"It cannot be stressed enough how instrumental the Enlightenment ideas were in changing history and society around the globe," said Abernethy. We still hold many Enlightenment ideals dear. Some of the scientific theories have evolved, but many remain as their Enlightenment authors wrote them. The concepts of liberty, reason and equality influenced early feminist Mary Wollstonecraft [mother of Mary Shelley, author of "Frankenstein"], American abolitionist Frederick Douglass and other seminal leaders.

"The ideas of religious tolerance and the separation of church and state did indeed lead to a reduction in wars due to religious differences," said Abernethy. As the power of the church waned, societies like the Freemasons and the Illuminati gained traction. Literary salons and coffeehouses emerged as new places to socialize and discuss ideas. Education for children became more widespread, and more universities were founded. Literacy rates increased dramatically, and public libraries and museums were introduced.

"The concepts of the Enlightenment led to many revolutions, which had a tremendous effect on changing history and society," said Abernethy. "In 1688, English Protestants were instrumental in overthrowing the Catholic monarch James II and installing the Protestant monarchs William and Mary. Afterwards, the English Parliament ratified a new Bill of Rights granting more personal freedoms for Englishmen."

The most famous Enlightenment-influenced revolutions were the French and American.

The American Revolution

"The Founding Fathers adopted many of the ideas of the Enlightenment philosophers in writing the Constitution and the Bill of Rights," said Abernethy. They gave less power to the government and more power to the people. She added that they also established universal education in America.

The French Revolution

The French Revolution took the English coup a step further and eliminated monarchy altogether. King Louis
XVI and his queen, Marie Antoinette, were beheaded and a Republican form of government was established.
"There's a debate about whether the Enlightenment affected society, or whether a society changing through different means affected the Enlightenment," said Wilde. "Either way, the ideas of Enlightenment ... influenced a French middle class to want a voice in government. In 1789, [this desire] produced a Third Estate, which broke away from royal rule, and triggered the French Revolution."

Though Enlightenment philosophy emphasized seemingly positive ideals like liberty and tolerance, Wilde noted that it could be taken to extremes. "It's important to stress that the Enlightenment thinkers weren't exactly sticking to the ideals of others ... and the extremes of Enlightenment thought, such as a rejection of the church, have been blamed for the terror in the revolution." The brutality of the revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars demonstrate the limits of attempting to remake society along purely rational lines."

Source:

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Enlightenment and Human Rights

"If the guillotine is the most striking negative image of the French Revolution, then the most positive is surely the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, one of the founding documents in the human rights tradition.

The lasting importance of the Declaration of Rights is immediately evident: just compare the first article from August 1789 with the first article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the United Nations after World War II, on 10 December 1948. They are very similar, though the UN document refers to "human beings" in place of "men." (Did "men" mean women too in 1789? As we shall see, this was far from clear.)

When the French revolutionaries drew up the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in August 1789, they aimed to topple the institutions surrounding hereditary monarchy and establish new ones based on the principles of the Enlightenment, a philosophical movement gathering steam in the eighteenth century. The goal of the Enlightenment's proponents was to apply the methods learned from the scientific revolution to the problems of society. Further, its advocates committed themselves to "reason" and "liberty." Knowledge, its followers believed, could only come from the careful study of actual conditions and the application of an individual's reason, not from religious inspiration or traditional beliefs. Liberty meant freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom from unreasonable government (torture, censorship, and so on). Enlightenment writers, such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, influenced ordinary readers, politicians, and even heads of state all over the Western world. Kings and queens consulted them, government ministers joined their cause, and in the British North American colonies, American revolutionaries put some of their ideas into practice in the Declaration of Independence and the new Constitution of the United States.

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 brought together two streams of thought: one springing from the Anglo-American tradition of legal and constitutional guarantees of individual liberties, the other from the Enlightenment's belief that reason should guide all human affairs. Enlightenment writers praised the legal and constitutional guarantees established by the English and the Americans, but they wanted to see them applied everywhere. The French revolutionaries therefore wrote a Declaration of Rights that they hoped would serve as a model in every corner of the world. Reason rather than tradition would be its justification. As a result, "France" or "French" never appears in the articles of the declaration itself, only in its preamble.

The Anglo-American tradition of legal guarantees of rights dates back to the Magna Carta, or "Great Charter," of 1215. In it King John of England guaranteed certain liberties to the free men of his kingdom. In 1628 the English Parliament drew up a Petition of Right restating the "rights and liberties of the subjects." Charles I agreed to it, and the rights were further extended in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. John Locke's writings on the nature of government in the late 1600s gave a more universal and theoretical caste to the idea of the rights of freeborn Englishmen, suggesting that such rights belonged not just to the English, but to all property-owning adult males.

Until Locke, the English tradition of rights had been just that, English. The various English parliamentary documents on rights had been specifically limited to freeborn Englishmen. They made no larger claims. The Enlightenment helped broaden the claims, and its effects can be seen in the American offshoots of the English parliamentary tradition of rights. Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence of 1776 claimed that "inalienable" rights were the foundation of all government, and he justified American resistance to English rule in these terms. Jefferson's "declaration" is especially important because it argued that rights had only to be "declared" to be effective. The same belief in the self-evidence of rights can be seen in George Mason's draft of the Bill of Rights for Virginia's state constitution. The similarities to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen are not hard to find, for both the Virginia Bill of Rights and Jefferson's Declaration of
Independence had an immediate influence on the French declaration.

Enlightenment writers had paved the way for the reception of these ideas on the European continent and
helped transform English rights into more universally applicable ones. They complained that in France these rights were being violated by despotic, absurd, superstitious, and fanatical institutions. Voltaire, in particular, held out English religious toleration as a model. In their criticism, Montesquieu and Rousseau moved beyond existing institutions, proposing new principles of government based on reason and comparative study.

Beginning in the last years of the reign of Louis XIV and intensifying thereafter, writers both within and outside France began strongly decrying the despotism of the French monarchy. In 1721, Montesquieu, a nobleman and judge, published an anonymous novel, *The Persian Letters* in which he used fictional letters between visiting Persians to lampoon French customs, particularly those of the recently deceased Louis XIV. Voltaire held French practices up against those in England, China, and elsewhere and found cause to ridicule French "fanaticism" in religion.

These and other criticisms paved the way for a more theoretical consideration of government in general. One of the most influential works of this nature was Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* (1748), which developed a comparative political analysis of the conditions most favorable to liberty. The American Founding Fathers studied this work closely. Rousseau, in his *Social Contract* of 1762, took the ideas of Montesquieu and also Locke a step further; he argued that all government rested on a social contract (not on divine right, not the Bible, not tradition of any kind) in which "the assembled people" (democracy) determined everything. For him, "the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate"; in other words, Rousseau insisted on complete equality (between men).

Although the most democratic of the Enlightenment writers, Rousseau said relatively little about rights. In fact, one of the most enduring criticisms of his work is that he failed to guarantee individual rights under the social contract. The community apparently took precedence over the individual in Rousseau's view. Other Enlightenment writers stepped into this gap. Voltaire made his reputation defending those who had been persecuted for their religious opinions. As yet, however, there was more talk about rights in general than about specific rights. Writers often referred to rights as if everyone knew what they meant, but in fact many ambiguities remained: Should Protestants or Jews have the same rights as Catholics in France? Should poor men have the same rights as property owners? Should women enjoy the same rights as men?

Despite the strong efforts of the French monarchy and the Catholic Church to ban the works of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, their influence soon spread, even to the highest echelons of the state that originally opposed them. Other monarchs in Europe eagerly sought the friendship and advice of Enlightenment writers, and it was only a matter of time before leading French bureaucrats also took up their ideas. Among the most striking cases was that of Turgot, one of the chief ministers of Louis XVI. His memorandum to the King of 1775 shows that talk of rights had permeated the highest levels of government.

Before the Revolution broke out in 1789, most discussion of rights in France focused on the plight of religious minorities. After years of criticism and discussion, the French crown granted certain civil rights to Protestants in 1787, but not political ones. Once civil rights had been granted to Protestants, it was perhaps inevitable that the question of Jewish rights would be raised. But the French monarchy did not offer any reforms in the status of Jews.

A particularly contentious issue in the 1780s was that of slavery. A powerful current of antislavery opinion was welling up in England, France, and the new United States, abetted in part by the influential anti-slavery tracts of a French Catholic clergyman, Abbé Raynal. Raynal denounced slavery along with most European commerce with the colonies. His work had great impact in the British North American colonies as well as in Europe.

Writers, philosophers, and clerics had long debated the question of a woman's role in society, but this discussion did little to inspire government action before 1789, or to prompt the formation of clubs or societies concerned with improving the status of women. Enlightenment writers interested in the subject focused on the education of women, rather than on their civil or political rights. Most people in France, men and women alike, believed that a woman's place was in the home, not in the public sphere. This widely held view helps explain the absence of organized women's groups in France before the outbreak of the Revolution. Once the King convoked the Estates-General in 1789, however, women took the opportunity to submit their
own petitions, thereby helping place their own concerns on the revolutionary agenda.
As the notion of rights spread, it became increasingly radical. When King Louis XVI called the Estates-General to meet in 1789, he inadvertently released a torrent of complaints about the future of the country in the form of pamphlets. One of the most influential of these pamphlets was written by a clergyman, Abbé Sieyès. In "What Is the Third Estate?", he offered a fundamentally new vision of French society in which position would be determined by usefulness, not birth. In short, he attacked the concept of a hereditary nobility. Sieyès’s pamphlet helped clear the way for the views that would be expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.

Before the revolutionaries could establish the Declaration of Rights as the fount of governing authority, however, they had to tear down the ancient edifice. They did not immediately abolish monarchy itself; instead they tried to put it on a different foundation of constitutionalism. But they did abolish the old system of special privileges. In one long session (throughout the night of 4 August 1789), the deputies to the new National Assembly voluntarily renounced the privileges of their towns, provinces, and various social groups. Nobles, clergy, judges, and even ordinary taxpayers lost whatever special standing they had gained over the centuries. From now on, everyone was to be identical before the law. This concept of equality became one of the cardinal principles of the new declaration, passed only three weeks later.

The declaration gave birth to the famous revolutionary triad: Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. In all images of the time, these principles were represented by female figures—but that did not mean women were about to gain equal access to the rights the triad embodied. The declaration said nothing about women, or about religious minorities, or men who did not own property, or slaves. Not surprisingly, the moment the declaration passed, the status of all these groups became the subject of heated debate.

The first issue taken up was the question of property qualifications for full citizenship. The National Assembly instituted property qualifications only to rescind them in 1792 and reinstitute them after 1795. When the question of religious minorities came up, the assembly readily agreed to grant full rights to Protestants but hesitated to do so for Jews. Jews petitioned for full rights and finally gained them on 27 September 1791.

The question of slavery was more complicated still, if only because a large proportion of French commerce depended on the colonies, whose agrarian economy rested heavily on that institution. In the French colonies, mulattos and free blacks had begun agitating for rights, but any such move was fiercely resisted by white planters, who feared it would undermine the entire slave system. The National Assembly tried to take a middle course, still supporting the slave system but granting rights to certain free blacks and mulattos (in May 1791). Some deputies wanted to abolish the slave trade and slavery itself. When a massive slave revolt broke out in the largest French colony, Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti; see Chapter 8), the deputies rescinded the rights of free blacks and mulattos, only to reinstitute them a few months later (March 1792). The assembly originally tried to suppress the slave revolt, but rather than lose the colony altogether when the slaves threatened to ally with Great Britain and Spain, the National Convention, on 4 February 1794, finally abolished slavery in all the colonies. It would be reestablished under Napoleon in 1802.

Once the French Revolution got under way, it sparked the first explicit feminist movement in history. Members of both sexes were now arguing that women should enjoy the same rights as men, but they were definitely in the minority. The prevailing view was still that women were fundamentally different from men and should confine themselves to domestic concerns. Nevertheless, a small number of women set up their own clubs and, though they hesitated to ask for the vote and other political rights, they insisted that women should be educated to be good republicans and should participate in the Revolution as much as possible, whether by ferreting out counterrevolutionaries, watching the marketplaces for infractions against the new price controls, making bandages for the war effort, or even on some rare occasions arming themselves to go to the front. In response to the upsurge in female political activity, the National Convention officially banned all women’s political clubs on 29–30 October 1793. Although women continued to be denied political rights, they had acquired more civil rights than ever before. New laws established divorce for the first time and gave women equal access to it; other laws insisted that girls have the same inheritance rights as boys when families passed on their property.

After all the debates, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen remained open to modification as the Revolution changed course. In 1793 the National Convention offered a new constitution, which included a
modified *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*. The new declaration repeated many of the provisions of the first one but added an emphasis on social welfare (Article 21: "Society owes maintenance to
unfortunate citizens"). Although the new constitution never went into effect (it was shelved while the country was at war), it and the declaration reflected a growing tension that would henceforth accompany the discussion of rights. Many questions remained to be answered: Should these rights be simple guarantees of legal freedom and equality, or should they encompass more ambitious prospects of social improvement and amelioration? Did rights apply just to legal and political activities, or did they also extend to the social and economic sphere of life? Did people have a right to help form their government?

In 1795 the National Convention wrote yet another constitution, and this one actually did go into effect. The deputies also prepared a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and Citizen thereby responding to a current of opinion that had already gathered some strength during the 1789 discussions. Should a declaration of rights not be accompanied by a declaration of duties? The duties listed here have a modern resonance: they include what we would call "family values," a defense of property, and a call to military service. Still, the declaration of duties made quite clear that both rights and duties pertained only to men."

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Famous People of the Enlightenment

“The Enlightenment or ‘Age of Reason’ was a period in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century, where a group of philosophers, scientists and thinkers advocated new ideas based on reason. This period saw a decline in the power of absolute monarchies, a decline in the pre-eminence of the church and a rise of modern political ideologies, such as liberalism, republicanism and greater independence of thought. The Enlightenment ideals were influential forces behind the American and French revolutions.

Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) English philosopher, statesman, orator and scientist. Bacon is considered the ‘father of empiricism’ for his work and advocacy of scientific method and methodical scientific inquiry in investigating scientific phenomena. He encouraged an empirical approach both through his own example and philosophically. A key figure in the Scientific revolution of the 17th Century.

Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) Rene Descartes was a French philosopher and mathematician. Descartes made a significant contribution to the philosophy of rationalism. Descartes’ Meditations was ground-breaking because he was willing to doubt previous certainties and tried to prove their validity through logic. Later empiricists disagreed with Descartes methods, but his philosophy opened up many topics to greater discussion. Although Descartes ‘proved’ the existence of God, his doubt was an important step in promoting reason over faith. Descartes also made important discoveries in analytical geometry, calculus and mathematics.

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) Spinoza was a Jewish-Dutch philosopher. He was an influential rationalist, who saw the underlying unity in the universe. He was critical of religious scriptures, and promoted a view that the Divine was in all, and the Universe was ordered, despite its apparent contradictions. His philosophy influenced later philosophers, writers and romantic poets, such as Shelley and Coleridge.

Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) Immanuel Kant was an influential German philosopher whose ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ sought to unite reason with experience and move philosophy on from the debate between rationalists and empiricists. Kant’s philosophy was influential on future German idealists and philosophers, such as Shelling and Schopenhauer.

John Locke (1632 – 1704) Locke was a leading philosopher and political theorist, who had a profound impact on liberal political thought. He is credited with ideas, such as the social contract – the idea government needs to be with the consent of the governed. Locke also argued for liberty, religious tolerance and rights to life and property. Locke was an influential figure on those involved in the American and French revolutions, such as Jefferson, Madison and Voltaire.


Voltaire (1694 – 1778) – French philosopher and critic. Best known for his work Candide (1762) which epitomises his satire and criticisms of social convention. Voltaire was instrumental in promoting republican ideas due to his criticism of the absolute monarchy of France.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) Rousseau was a political philosopher widely known for his Social Contract’ (1762), which sought to promote a more egalitarian form of government by consent and formed the basis of modern republicanism. His ideas were influential in the French and American revolutions.

Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) One of the American Founding Fathers of the United States. He was an author, politician, diplomat, scientist and statesman. He was a key figure in the American enlightenment,
which saw major breakthroughs in science and ideas of political republicanism. Franklin was an early supporter of colonial unity and the United States.
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was an American Founding Father and the principle author of *The Declaration of Independence* (1776) In this declaration, Jefferson laid out the fundamental principles of America, calling for equality and liberty. He also advocated ending slavery and promoting religious tolerance.

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Supporting Question 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting Question</th>
<th>What were the social, economic and political problems that were pointed out by the Enlightenment writers?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formative Performance Task</td>
<td>Match major Enlightenment writers with the social, economic and political problems pointed out in their writings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Featured Sources | - **Source A**: John Locke: Excerpts from the Second Treatise of Government from earlymoderntexts.com  
  - **Source B**: Excerpts from The Spirit of the Laws by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu from constitution.org  
  - **Source C**: Excerpts from An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith from econlib.org |

After having discovered what the Enlightenment was and what the writers of the period viewed about human rights, young scholars must then point out specifically what the social, economic, and political problems that were pointed out in the period this inquiry is critically analyzing. This stage of the inquiry will take at least 2 days to accomplish this formative performance task and answer the supporting question correctly.

**Formative Performance Task**

Since peer team study and evaluations are very important to young scholars and it encourages ownership in the overall mastery of all the scholars, your young scholars will create a matching assessment test for mastery of the material of what the Enlightenment writers were pointing out in their writings for other scholars who are also participating in this inquiry. It is important that these scholars not only make out the assessment exams, but have a key to grade the mastery of the other scholars to provide peer feedback. When these scholars have to make out the exams and prepare for someone else’s random exam, it is clear they will study very hard to master this formative performance task.
Excerpts from Chapter 2: The state of nature

"4. To understand political power correctly and derive it from its proper source, we must consider what state all men are naturally in. In this state men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without asking anyone's permission—subject only to limits set by the law of nature. It is also a state of equality, in which no-one has more power and authority than anyone else; because it is simply obvious that creatures of the same species and status, all born to all the same advantages of nature and to the use of the same abilities, should also be equal—in other ways, with none being subjected to or subordinate to anyone else, unless God, the lord and master of them all, were to declare clearly and explicitly his wish that some one person be raised above the others and given an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

6. But though this is a state of liberty, it isn't a state of licence—in which there are no constraints on how people behave. A man in that state is absolutely free to dispose of himself or his possessions, but he isn't at liberty to destroy himself, or even to destroy any created thing in his possession unless something nobler than its mere preservation is at stake. The state of nature is governed by a law that creates obligations for everyone. And reason, which is that law, teaches anyone who takes the trouble to consult it, that because we are all equal and independent, no-one ought to harm anyone else in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. This is because • we are all the work of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker; • we are all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order to do his business; • we are all the property of him who made us, and he made us to last as long as he chooses, not as long as we choose; • we have the same abilities, and share in one common nature, so there can't be any rank-ordering that would authorize some of us to destroy others, as if we were made to be used by one another, as the lower kinds of creatures are made to be used by us. Everyone is obliged to preserve himself and not opt out of life willfully, so for the same reason everyone ought, when his own survival isn't at stake, to do as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind; and except when it's a matter of punishing an offender, no-one may take away or damage anything that contributes to the preservation of someone else's life, liberty, health, limb, or goods.

7. So that • all men may be held back from invading the rights of others and from harming one another, and so that • the law of nature that aims at the peace and preservation of all mankind may be obeyed, the enforcement of that law of nature (in the state of nature) is in every man's hands, so that everyone has a right to punish law-breakers as severely as is needed to hinder the violation of the law. For the law of nature, like every law concerning men in this world, would be futile if no-one had power to enforce it and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And in the state of nature if anyone may punish someone for something bad that he has done, then everyone may do so.

13. To this strange doctrine—of mine, namely that in the state of nature everyone has the power to enforce the law of nature, I expect this objection to be raised: It is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, because self-love will bias men in favour of themselves and their friends. And on the other side, hostility, passion and revenge will lead them to punish others too severely. So nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that is why God has—as he certainly has—established government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I freely allow that civil government is the proper remedy for the drawbacks of the state of nature. There must certainly be great disadvantages in a state where men may be judges in their own case; someone who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury will (we may well suppose) hardly be so just as to condemn himself for it! But I respond to the objector as follows: If the state of nature is intolerable because of the evils that are bound to follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and government is to be the remedy for this, let us do a comparison. On the one side there is the state of nature; on the other there is government where one man—and remember that absolute monarchs are only men!—commands a multitude, is free to be the judge in his own case, and can do what he likes to all his subjects, with no-one being allowed to question or control those who carry out his wishes, and everyone having to put up with
whatever he does, whether he is led by reason, mistake or passion. How much better it is in the state of nature, where no man is obliged to submit to the unjust will of someone else, and someone who judges
wrongly (whether or not it is in his own case) is answerable for that to the rest of mankind!"

Excerpts from Chapter 3: The state of war

"16. The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction. So when someone declares by word or action—not in a sudden outburst of rage, but as a matter of calm settled design—that he intends to end another man’s life, he puts himself into a state of war against the other person; and he thereby exposes his life to the risk of falling to the power of the other person or anyone that joins with him in his defence and takes up his quarrel. For it is reasonable and just that I should have a right to destroy anything that threatens me with destruction, because the fundamental law of nature says that men are to be preserved as much as possible, and that when not everyone can be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred. In line with this, I may destroy a man who makes war on me or has revealed himself as an enemy to my life, for the same reason that I may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no rule except that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey—dangerous creatures that will certainly destroy me if I fall into their power.

17. So it comes about that someone who tries to get another man into his absolute power thereby puts himself into a state of war with the other, for such an attempt amounts to a declaration of a plan against the life of the other man. If someone wants to get me into his power without my consent, I have reason to conclude that would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and would destroy me if he wanted to; for no one can want to have me in his absolute power unless it’s to compel me by force to something that is against the right of my freedom, i.e. to make me a slave. To be sure of my own survival I must be free from such force; and reason tells me to look on him—the person who wants 7 Second Treatise John Locke: The state of me in his power—as an enemy to my survival, wanting to take away the freedom that is the fence to it. So someone who tries to enslave me thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. Someone wants to take away the freedom of someone else must be supposed to have a plan to take away everything else from the person, because freedom is the foundation of all the rest; and that holds in a commonwealth as well as in the state of nature.

18. This makes it lawful for me to kill a thief who hasn’t done me any harm or declared any plan against my life, other than using force to get me in his power so as to take away my money or whatever else he wants. No matter what he claims he is up to, he is using force without right, to get me into his power; so I have no reason to think that he won’t, when he has me in his power, take everything else away from me as well as my liberty. So it is lawful for me to treat him as someone who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. to kill him if I can; for that is the risk he ran when he started a war in which he is the aggressor.

19. This is the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war. Some men—notably Hobbes—have treated them as the same; but in fact they are as distant from one another as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation is distant from a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction. A state of nature, properly understood, involves men living together according to reason, with no one on earth who stands above them both and has authority to judge between them. Whereas in a state of war a man uses or declares his intention to use force against another man, with no one on earth to whom the other can appeal for relief. It is the lack of such an appeal that gives a man the right of war against an aggressor, not only in a state of nature but even if they are both subjects in a single society. If a thief has already stolen all that I am worth and is not a continuing threat to me, I may not harm him except through an appeal to the law. But if he is now setting on me to rob me—even if it’s just my horse or my coat that he is after—I may kill him. There is the law, which was made for my protection, but there is no time for it to intervene to save me from losing my goods and perhaps losing my life (and if I lose that there is no reparation). Furthermore, it is the thief’s fault that there is no time for an appeal to the judge that stands over him and me—namely, the law—and so I am allowed to make my own defence, and to be at war with the thief and to kill him if I can. What puts men into a state of nature is the lack of a common judge who has authority; the use of unlawful force against a man’s person creates a state of war, whether or not there is a common judge and (therefore) whether or not they are in a state of nature.

20. But for men who are in a society—under a government—the state of war ends when the actual force ends; and then those on each side of the trouble should equally submit to the fair determination of the law. . . But
in the state of nature, where there are no positive laws or judges with authority to appeal to, once a state of war has begun it continues—with the innocent party having a right to destroy the other if he can—until the
aggressor offers peace, and seeks reconciliation on terms that will make up for any wrongs he has done and will give the innocent person security from then on. What if the situation is like this? There is time and opportunity for an appeal to the law, and to legally constituted judges, but the remedy is not available because of a manifest perverting of justice, a barefaced twisting of the laws so that they protect or even reward the violence or injuries perpetrated by some men or some party of men. In such a case it is hard to think we have anything but a state of war. For wherever violence is used and injury done, even if it is done by people appointed to administer justice and is dressed up in the name, claims, or forms of law, it is still violence and injury. The purpose of the law is to protect and get compensation for the innocent, by an unbiased treatment of all who come under it; and when this is not genuinely done, war is made upon the sufferers, and they—having nowhere on earth to appeal to for justice—are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven."

Excerpts from Chapter 4: Slavery

"22. The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of men but to be ruled only by the law of nature. The liberty of man in society is to be under no legislative power except the one established by consent in the commonwealth; and not under the power of any will or under restraint from any law except what is enacted by the legislature in accordance with its mandate. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us (Observations on Hobbes, Milton, etc., page 55), namely a liberty for everyone to do what he wants, live as he pleases, and not be tied by any laws. Rather, freedom is one of two things. Freedom of nature is being under no restraint except the law of nature. Freedom of men under government is having a standing rule to live by, common to everyone in the society in question, and made by the legislative power that has been set up in it; a liberty to follow one’s own will in anything that isn’t forbidden by the rule, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.

23...This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to a man’s survival, so tightly tied to it, that losing it involves losing all control over his own life. That’s why no one can voluntarily enter into slavery. A man doesn’t have the power to take his own life, so he can’t voluntarily enslave himself to anyone, or put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of someone else to take away his life whenever he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has; so someone who cannot take away his own life cannot give someone else such a power over it. If someone performs an act that deserves death, he has by his own fault forfeited his own life; the person to whom he has forfeited it may (when he has him in his power) delay taking it and instead make use of the offending man for his own purposes; and this isn’t doing him any wrong, because whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery to outweigh the value of his life, he has the power to resist the will of his master, thus bringing the death that he wants.

24. What I have been discussing is the condition of complete slavery, which is just a continuation of the state of war between a lawful conqueror and a captive. If they enter into any kind of pact—agreeing to limited power on the one side and obedience on the other—the state of war and slavery ceases for as long as the pact is in effect. For, as I have said, no man can by an agreement pass over to someone else something that he doesn’t himself have, namely a power over his own life. I admit that we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, cases where men sold themselves; but clearly they sold themselves only into drudgery, not slavery. It is evident that the person who was sold wasn’t thereby put at the mercy of an absolute, arbitrary, despotic power; for the master was obliged at a certain time to let the other go free from his service, and so he couldn’t at any time have the power to kill him. Indeed the master of this kind of servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he couldn’t arbitrarily even maim him: the loss of an eye or a tooth set him free (Exodus xxi)."

Excerpt from Chapter 6: Paternal power

"61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we as newborn babies actually have the use of either: age that brings reason brings freedom with it."

Excerpts from Chapter 7: Political or Civil Society
"90. This makes it evident that absolute monarchy, which some people regard as the only genuine government in the world, is actually inconsistent with civil society and so can’t be a form of civil government.
at all! Consider what civil society is for. It is set up to avoid and remedy the drawbacks of the state of nature that inevitably follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority to which every member of that society can appeal when he has been harmed or is involved in a dispute—an authority that everyone in the society ought to obey. So any people who don’t have such an authority to appeal to for the settlement of their disputes are still in the state of nature. Thus, every absolute monarch is in the state of nature with respect to those who are under his dominion.

91. For an absolute monarch is supposed to have both legislative and executive power in himself alone; so there is no judge or court of appeal that can fairly, impartially, and authoritatively make decisions that could provide relief and compensation for any harm that may be inflicted by the monarch or on his orders. So such a man—call him Czar or Grand Seignior or what you will—is as much in the state of nature with respect to his subjects as he is with respect to the rest of mankind. This is a special case of the state of nature, because between it and the ordinary state of nature there is this difference, a woeful one for the subject (really, the slave) of an absolute monarch: in the ordinary state of nature a man is free to judge what he has a right to, and to use the best of his power to maintain his rights; whereas in an absolute monarchy, when his property is invaded by the will of his monarch, he not only has no one to appeal to but he isn’t even free to judge what his rights are or to defend them (as though he were a cat or a dog, that can’t think for itself). He is, in short, exposed to all the misery and inconveniences that a man can fear from someone who is in the unrestrained state of nature and is also corrupted with flattery and armed with power.

Excerpts from Chapter 8: The beginning of political societies

"95. Men all being naturally free, equal, and independent, no-one can be deprived of this freedom etc. and subjected to the political power of someone else, without his own consent. The only way anyone can strip off his natural liberty and clothe himself in the bonds of civil society is for him to agree with other men to unite into a community, so as to live together comfortably, safely, and peaceably, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against outsiders. Any number of men can do this, because it does no harm to the freedom of the rest; they are left with the liberty of the state of nature, which they had all along. When any number of men have in this way consented to make one community or government, that immediately incorporates them, turns them into a single body politic in which the majority have a right to act on behalf of the rest and to bind them by its decisions.

99. So those who out of a state of nature unite into a community must be understood to give up all the power required to secure its purposes to the majority of the community (unless they explicitly agree on some number greater than the majority). They achieve this simply by agreeing to unite into one political society; that’s all the compact that is needed between the individuals that create or join a commonwealth. Thus, what begins a political society and keeps it in existence is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. This is the only thing that did or could give a beginning to any lawful government in the world."

Excerpt from Chapter 18: Tyranny

"202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the breach of the law brings harm to someone else; and anyone in authority who exceeds the power given him by the law, using the force at his disposal to do to the subject things that aren’t allowed by the law, thereby stops being an officer of the law; and because he acts without authority he may rightly be opposed, as may any other man who by force invades the right of someone else."

Excerpts from Chapter 19: The dissolution of government

"229. The purpose of government is the good of mankind. Which is better for mankind: that the people be always exposed to the limitless will of tyranny, or that the rulers be sometimes liable to meet with opposition when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power and use it for the destruction and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

232. Anyone who uses force without right (as everyone in society does if he uses force without law) puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he uses it; and in that state all former bonds are cancelled, all other rights cease, and everyone has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor. This is
so obvious that Barclay himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is forced to admit that it is sometimes lawful for the people to resist their king; and he says it, what’s more, in a chapter in
which he offers to show that the divine law blocks the people from every kind of rebellion! In fact his own doctrine makes it clear that since the people may resist in some cases, not all resistance to monarchs is rebellion. His words are these.

240. At this point you are likely to ask: Who is to be the judge of whether the monarch or legislature have acted contrary to their trust? That they have so acted is the sort of thing that can be spread around among the people by discontented and factious men, when all the king has done is to make use of his legitimate prerogative. To this I reply, The people should be judge; for who should judge whether a trustee or deputy has acted well and according to the trust reposed in him, if not the person who deputes him? Having deputed him, he must have still a power to discard him when he fails in his trust. If this is reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in this most important case where the welfare of millions is concerned, and where the threatened evil is greater, and redressing it is very difficult, costly, and dangerous?

241. Furthermore, the question ‘Who is to be the judge?’ can’t mean that there is no judge at all; for when there is no judicature on earth to decide controversies among men, God in heaven is the judge. It is true that God alone is the judge of what is right. But every man is judge for himself, in this case as in all others, of whether another man has put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the supreme judge.

242. If a controversy arises between a king and some of the people, in a matter of great importance where the law is silent, or doubtful, I think the right umpire would be the body of the people. For in cases where the king has a trust placed in him and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law, if any private men are aggrieved and think that the king acts beyond that trust or contrary to it, the body of the people who first placed that trust in him are clearly the best judges of how far they meant the trust to extend. If that way of settling the matter is turned down by the king, or whoever is administering the government, the only court of appeal is in heaven. . . . What we have here is properly a state of war, in which the only appeal is to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself when it is fit for him to make such an appeal.”

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Second Treatise of Government  by John Locke

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Excerpts from Book XI: Of the Laws, Which Establish Political Liberty, with Regard to the Constitution

"2. Different Significations of the word Liberty. There is no word that admits of more various significations, and has made more varied impressions on the human mind, than that of liberty. Some have taken it as a means of deposing a person on whom they had conferred a tyrannical authority; others for the power of choosing a superior whom they are obliged to obey; others for the right of bearing arms, and of being thereby enabled to use violence; others, in fine, for the privilege of being governed by a native of their own country, or by their own laws.[1] A certain nation for a long time thought liberty consisted in the privilege of wearing a long beard.[2] Some have annexed this name to one form of government exclusive of others: those who had a republican taste applied it to this species of polity; those who liked a monarchical state gave it to monarchy. [3] Thus they have all applied the name of liberty to the government most suitable to their own customs and inclinations: and as in republics the people have not so constant and so present a view of the causes of their misery, and as the magistrates seem to act only in conformity to the laws, hence liberty is generally said to reside in republics, and to be banished from monarchicals. In fine, as in democracies the people seem to act almost as they please, this sort of government has been deemed the most free, and the power of the people has been confounded with their liberty.

3. In what Liberty consists. It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In governments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.

4. The same Subject continued. Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits.

6. Of the Constitution of England. In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state. The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people[7] at certain times of the
year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires. By this method the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being
annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate. In accusations of a deep and criminal nature, it is proper the person accused should have the privilege of choosing, in some measure, his judges, in concurrence with the law; or at least he should have a right to except against so great a number that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice. The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general will. But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society, without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations. The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers; to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of persons inclined to treat him with rigour. If the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good behaviour, there is an end of liberty; unless they are taken up, in order to answer without delay to a capital crime, in which case they are really free, being subject only to the power of the law."

Excerpts from Book XII. Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, in Relation to the Subject

"12. Of indiscreet Speeches. Nothing renders the crime of high treason more arbitrary than declaring people guilty of it for indiscreet speeches. Speech is so subject to interpretation; there is so great a difference between indiscretion and malice; and frequently so little is there of the latter in the freedom of expression, that the law can hardly subject people to a capital punishment for words unless it expressly declares what words they are.[34] Words do not constitute an overt act; they remain only in idea. When considered by themselves, they have generally no determinate signification; for this depends on the tone in which they are uttered. It often happens that in repeating the same words they have not the same meaning; this depends on their connection with other things, and sometimes more is signified by silence than by any expression whatever. Since there can be nothing so equivocal and ambiguous as all this, how is it possible to convert it into a crime of high treason? Wherever this law is established, there is an end not only of liberty, but even of its very shadow.

13. Of Writings. In writings there is something more permanent than in words, but when they are in no way preparative to high treason they cannot amount to that charge."

Excerpts from Book XV. In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Relate to the Nature of the Climate

"1. Of civil Slavery. Slavery, properly so called, is the establishment of a right which gives to one man such a power over another as renders him absolute master of his life and fortune. The state of slavery is in its own nature bad. It is neither useful to the master nor to the slave; not to the slave, because he can do nothing through a motive of virtue; nor to the master, because by having an unlimited authority over his slaves he insensibly accustoms himself to the want of all moral virtues, and thence becomes fierce, hasty, severe, choleric, voluptuous, and cruel. In despotic countries, where they are already in a state of political servitude, civil slavery is more tolerable than in other governments. Every one ought to be satisfied in those countries with necessaries and life. Hence the condition of a slave is hardly more burdensome than that of a subject. But in a monarchical government, where it is of the utmost importance that human nature should not be debased or dispirited, there ought to be no slavery. In democracies, where they are all upon equality; and in aristocracies, where the laws ought to use their utmost endeavors to procure as great an equality as the nature of the government will permit, slavery is contrary to the spirit of the constitution: it only contributes to give a power and luxury to the citizens which they ought not to have. Neither is it true that a freeman can sell himself. Sale implies a price; now when a person sells himself, his whole substance immediately devolves to his master; the master, therefore, in that case, gives nothing, and the slave receives nothing. You will say he has a peculium. But this peculium goes along with his person. If it is not lawful for a man to kill himself because he robs his country of his person, for the same reason he is not allowed to barter his freedom. The freedom of every citizen constitutes a part of the public liberty, and in a democratic state is even a part of the sovereignty. To sell one's freedom[3] is so repugnant to all reason as can scarcely be supposed in any man. If liberty may be rated with respect to the buyer, it is beyond all price to the seller. The civil law, which authorises a division of goods among men, cannot be thought to rank among such goods a part of the men
who were to make this division. The same law annuls all iniquitous contracts; surely then it affords redress in a contract where the grievance is most enormous. The third way is birth, which falls with the two former; for
if a man could not sell himself, much less could he sell an unborn infant. If a prisoner of war is not to be reduced to slavery, much less are his children. If it be pretended that it has been beneficial to him, as his master has provided for his subsistence, slavery, at this rate, should be limited to those who are incapable of earning their livelihood. But who will take up with such slaves? As to infants, nature, who has supplied their mothers with milk, had provided for their sustenance; and the remainder of their childhood approaches so near the age in which they are most capable of being of service that he who supports them cannot be said to give them an equivalent which can entitle him to be their master. Nor is slavery less opposed to the civil law than to that of nature. What civil law can restrain a slave from running away, since he is not a member of society, and consequently has no interest in any civil institutions? He can be retained only by a family law, that is, by the master's authority. But as all men are born equal, slavery must be accounted unnatural, though in some countries it be founded on natural reason; and a wide difference ought to be made between such countries, and those in which even natural reason rejects it, as in Europe, where it has been so happily abolished."

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Book I

*Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally distributed among the different Ranks of the People*

Book I, Chapter I

Of the Division of Labor*16

1.1.1

The greatest improvement*17 in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.

1.1.2

The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood, by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures.

1.1.3

To take an example, therefore,*19 from a very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade)*20 nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.*21 I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

1.1.5

This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing,*26 is owing to three different circumstances; first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing
from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.*27
Book I, Chapter V

Of the Real and Nominal Price of Commodities, or of their Price in Labour, and their Price in Money

1.5.1

Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusements of human life.*1 But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man’s own labour can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.

1.5.2

The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour,*2 as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.

1.5.3

Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power.*3 But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power; or to the quantity either of other men’s labour, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other men’s labour, which it enables him to purchase or command. The exchangeable value of every thing must always be precisely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner.*4

1.5.4

But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportion between two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different sorts of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and of ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be more labour in an hour's hard work than in two hours easy business; or in an hour's application to a trade which it cost ten years labour to learn, than in a month's industry at an ordinary and obvious employment. But it is not easy to find any accurate measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In exchanging indeed the different productions of different sorts of labour for one another, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the haggling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of common life.*5

1.5.5

Every commodity besides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby compared with, other commodities
than with labour. It is more natural therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of some other commodity than by that of the labour which it can purchase. The greater part of people too understand
better what is meant by a quantity of a particular commodity, than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object; the other an abstract notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.

1.5.6

But when barter ceases, and money has become the common instrument of commerce, every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than for any other commodity. The butcher seldom carries his beef or his mutton to the baker, or the brewer, in order to exchange them for bread or for beer; but he carries them to the market, where he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges that money for bread and for beer. The quantity of money which he gets for them regulates too the quantity of bread and beer which he can afterwards purchase. It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to estimate their value by the quantity of money, the commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, than by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he can exchange them only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to say that his butcher’s meat is worth threepence or fourpence a pound, than that it is worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of small beer. Hence it comes to pass, that the exchangeable value of every commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange for it.

1.5.7

Gold and silver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their value, are sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. The discovery of the abundant mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been before.*6 As it cost less labour to bring those metals from the mine to the market, so when they were brought thither*7 they could purchase or command less labour; and this revolution in their value, though perhaps the greatest, is by no means the only one of which history gives some account. But as a measure of quantity, such as the natural foot, fathom, or hand, which is continually varying in its own quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things; so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value, can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be*8 of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity,*9 he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.

1.5.8

But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be of greater and sometimes of smaller value. He purchases them sometimes with a greater and sometimes with a smaller quantity of goods, and to him the price of labour seems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to him dear in the one case, and cheap in the other. In reality, however, it is the goods which are cheap in the one case, and dear in the other.

1.5.9

In this popular sense, therefore, labour, like commodities, may be said to have a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be said to consist in the quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given for it; its nominal price, in the quantity of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in
proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour.

I.5.10
The distinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities and labour, is not a matter of mere speculation, but may sometimes be of considerable use in practice. The same real price is always of the same value; but on account of the variations in the value of gold and silver, the same nominal price is sometimes of very different values. When a landed estate, therefore, is sold with a reservation of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of importance to the family in whose favour it is reserved, that it should not consist in a particular sum of money. Its value would in this case be liable to variations of two different kinds; first, to those which arise from the different quantities of gold and silver which are contained at different times in coin of the same denomination; and, secondly, to those which arise from the different values of equal quantities of gold and silver at different times.

Book I, Chapter VII

Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodity

I.7.1

There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate both of wages and profit in every different employment of labour and stock. This rate is naturally regulated, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining condition; and partly by the particular nature of each employment.

I.7.2

There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate of rent, which is regulated too, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is situated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land.

I.7.3

These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages, profit, and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail.

I.7.4

When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price.

I.7.5

The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the person who brings it to market; for though in common language what is called the prime cost of any commodity does not comprehend the profit of the person who is to sell it again, yet if he sells it at a price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the trade; since by employing his stock in some other way he might have made that profit. His profit, besides, is his revenue, the proper fund of his subsistence. As, while he is preparing and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his workmen their wages, or their subsistence; so he advances to himself, in the same manner, his own subsistence, which is generally suitable to the profit which he may reasonably expect from the sale of his goods. Unless they yield him this profit, therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be said to have really cost him.

I.7.6

Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit, is not always the lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at which he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where there is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleases.

I.7.7
The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold is called its market price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its natural price.
I.7.8

The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labour, and profit,*69 which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; since it may be sufficient to effectuate the bringing of the commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor man may be said in some sense to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never be brought to market in order to satisfy it.

I.7.9

When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin among them, and the market price will rise more or less above the natural price, according as either the greatness of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or less the eagerness of the competition. Among competitors of equal wealth and luxury the same deficiency*70 will generally occasion a more or less eager competition, according as the acquisition of the commodity happens to be of more or less importance to them.*71 Hence the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life during the blockade of a town or in a famine.

I.7.10

When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market price will sink more or less below the natural price, according as the greatness of the excess increases more or less the competition of the sellers, or according as it happens to be more or less important to them to get immediately rid of the commodity. The same excess in the importation of perishable, will occasion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.

I.7.11

When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual demand and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. The whole quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and cannot be disposed of for more. The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept of less.

I.7.12

The quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally suits itself to the effectual demand. It is the interest of all those who employ their land, labour, or stock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity never should exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interest of all other people that it never should fall short of that demand.*72

I.7.13

If at any time it exceeds the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their land; and if it is wages or profit, the interest of the labourers in the one case, and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw a part of their labour or stock from this employment. The quantity brought to market will soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will rise to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.
If, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market should at any time fall short of the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must rise above their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of all other landlords will naturally prompt them to prepare more land for the raising of this commodity; if it is wages or profit, the interest of all other labourers and dealers will soon prompt them to employ more labour and stock in preparing and bringing it to market. The quantity brought thither will soon be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will soon sink to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.

I.7.15

The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.

I.7.16

The whole quantity of industry annually employed in order to bring any commodity to market, naturally suits itself in this manner to the effectual demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precise quantity thither which may be sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, that demand.

I.7.17

But in some employments the same quantity of industry will in different years produce very different quantities of commodities: while in others it will produce always the same, or very nearly the same. The same number of labourers in husbandry will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, oil, hops, &c. But the same number of spinners and weavers will every year produce the same or very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen cloth. It is only the average produce of the one species of industry which can be suited in any respect to the effectual demand; and as its actual produce is frequently much greater and frequently much less than its average produce, the quantity of the commodities brought to market will sometimes exceed a good deal, and sometimes fall short a good deal of the effectual demand. Even though that demand therefore should continue always the same, their market price will be liable to great fluctuations, will sometimes fall a good deal below, and sometimes rise a good deal above, their natural price.

In the other species of industry, the produce of equal quantities of labour being always the same, or very nearly the same, it can be more exactly suited to the effectual demand. While that demand continues the same, therefore, the market price of the commodities is likely to do so too, and to be either altogether, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. That the price of linen and woollen cloth is liable neither to such frequent nor to such great variations as the price of corn, every man's experience will inform him. The price of the one species of commodities varies only with the variations in the demand: That of the other varies not only with the variations in the demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations in the quantity of what is brought to market in order to supply that demand.

I.7.18

The occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of any commodity fall chiefly upon those parts of its price which resolve themselves into wages and profit. That part which resolves itself into rent is less affected by them. A rent certain in money is not in the least affected by them either in its rate or in its value. A rent which consists either in a certain proportion or in a certain quantity of the rude produce, is no doubt affected in its yearly value by all the occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of that rude produce; but it is seldom affected by them in its yearly rate. In settling the terms of the lease, the landlord and farmer endeavour, according to their best judgment, to adjust that rate, not to the temporary and occasional, but to the average and ordinary price of the produce.

I.7.19

Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate either of wages or of profit, according as the market happens to be either over-stocked or under-stocked with commodities or with labour; with work done, or
with work to be done. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth\textsuperscript{74} (with which the market is almost always under-stocked upon such occasions) and augments the profits of the merchants who possess any
considerable quantity of it. It has no effect upon the wages of the weavers. The market is under-stocked with commodities, not with labour; with work done, not with work to be done. It raises the wages of journeymen tailors. The market is here under-stocked with labour. There is an effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done than can be had. It sinks the price of coloured silks and cloths, and thereby reduces the profits of the merchants who have any considerable quantity of them upon hand. It sinks too the wages of the workmen employed in preparing such commodities, for which all demand is stopped for six months, perhaps for a twelvemonth. The market is here over-stocked with commodities and with labour.

I.7.20

But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this manner continually gravitating, if one may say so, towards the natural price, yet sometimes particular accidents, sometimes natural causes, and sometimes particular regulations of police, may, in many commodities, keep up the market price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural price.

I.7.21

When by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price, those who employ their stocks in supplying that market are generally careful to conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt so many new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way, that, the effectual demand being fully supplied, the market price would soon be reduced to the natural price, and perhaps for some time even below it. If the market is at a great distance from the residence of those who supply it, they may sometimes be able to keep the secret for several years together, and may so long enjoy their extraordinary profits without any new rivals. Secrets of this kind, however, it must be acknowledged, can seldom be long kept; and the extraordinary profit can last very little longer than they are kept.

I.7.22

Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than secrets in trade. A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour with materials which cost only half the price of those commonly made use of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his posterity. His extraordinary gains arise from the high price which is paid for his private labour. They properly consist in the high wages of that labour. But as they are repeated upon every part of his stock, and as their whole amount bears, upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they are commonly considered as extraordinary profits of stock.

I.7.23

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of particular accidents, of which, however, the operation may sometimes last for many years together.

I.7.24

Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to market, therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to give more than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them, together with the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock which were employed in preparing and bringing them to market, according to their natural rates. Such commodities may continue for whole centuries together to be sold at this high price; and that part of it which resolves itself into the rent of land is in this case the part which is generally paid above its natural rate. The rent of the land which affords such singular and esteemed productions, like the rent of some vineyards in France of a peculiarly happy soil and situation, bears no regular proportion to the rent of other equally fertile and equally well-cultivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed in bringing such commodities to market, on the contrary, are seldom out of their natural proportion to those of the other employments of labour and stock in their neighbourhood.
Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural causes which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully supplied, and which may continue, therefore, to operate for-ever.

I.7.26

A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.

I.7.27

The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable time altogether. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to give; The other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their business.

I.7.28

The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship,*78 and all those laws which restrain, in particular employments, the competition to a smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate.

I.7.29

Such enhancements of the market price may last as long as the regulations of police which give occasion to them.

I.7.30

The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue long above, can seldom continue long below, its natural price. Whatever part of it was paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected would immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw either so much land, or so much labour, or so much stock, from being employed about it, that the quantity brought to market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would soon rise to the natural price. This at least would be the case where there was perfect liberty.*79

I.7.31

The same statutes of apprenticeship and other corporation laws indeed, which, when a manufacture is in prosperity, enable the workman to raise his wages a good deal above their natural rate, sometimes oblige him, when it decays, to let them down a good deal below it. As in the one case they exclude many people from his employment, so in the other they exclude him from many employments. The effect of such regulations, however, is not near so durable in sinking the workman's wages below, as in raising them above their natural rate. Their operation in the one way may endure for many centuries, but in the other it can last no longer than the lives of some of the workmen who were bred to the business in the time of its prosperity. When they are gone, the number of those who are afterwards educated to the trade will naturally suit itself to the effectual demand. The police must be as violent as that of Indostan or antient Egypt*80 (where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he changed it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for several generations together, sink either the wages of labour or the profits of stock below their natural rate.

I.7.32
This is all that I think necessary to be observed at present concerning the deviations, whether occasional or permanent, of the market price of commodities from the natural price.
The natural price itself varies with the natural rate of each of its component parts, of wages, profit, and rent; and in every society this rate varies according to their circumstances, according to their riches or poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining condition. I shall, in the four following chapters, endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, the causes of those different variations.

First, I shall endeavour to explain what are the circumstances which naturally determine the rate of wages, and in what manner those circumstances are affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing, stationary or declining state of the society.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what are the circumstances which naturally determine the rate of profit, and in what manner too those circumstances are affected by the like variations in the state of the society.

Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different employments of labour and stock; yet a certain proportion seems commonly to take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different employments of labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different employments of stock. This proportion, it will appear hereafter, depends partly upon the nature of the different employments, and partly upon the different laws and policy of the society in which they are carried on. But though in many respects dependent upon the laws and policy, this proportion seems to be little affected by the riches or poverty of that society; by its advancing, stationary, or declining condition; but to remain the same or very nearly the same in all those different states. I shall, in the third place, endeavour to explain all the different circumstances which regulate this proportion.

In the fourth and last place, I shall endeavour to show what are the circumstances which regulate the rent of land, and which either raise or lower the real price of all the different substances which it produces.

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### Supporting Question 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting Question</th>
<th>What did Enlightenment writers say that would inspire others to think differently about their current social, political and economic condition?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formative Performance Task</td>
<td>In a short essay, summarize what the Enlightenment writers said in their writings and suggest what might inspire others to think differently about their current condition socially, politically and economically.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Featured Sources | ○ **Source A**: John Locke: Excerpts from the Second Treatise of Government from earlymoderntexts.com  
○ **Source B**: Excerpts from The Spirit of the Laws by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu from constitution.org  
○ **Source C**: Excerpts from An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith from econlib.org |

After having accomplished supporting question 2 formative performance task, young scholars will use the provided documents to think about what the Enlightenment writers said that would inspire others to think differently about their current social, political, and economic condition. This question is geared not only at the time period involved, but also for the present time in America. This stage of the inquiry will take 2 days to accomplish the formative performance task.

**Formative Performance Task**

Young scholars will express an answer to the formative performance task using the sources provided, and also include how this can be attached to current conditions of peoples in the United States socially, politically, and economically in the form of an essay.
Excerpts from Chapter 2: The state of nature

"4. To understand political power correctly and derive it from its proper source, we must consider what state all men are naturally in. In this state men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without asking anyone’s permission—subject only to limits set by the law of nature. It is also a state of equality, in which no-one has more power and authority than anyone else; because it is simply obvious that creatures of the same species and status, all born to all the same advantages of nature and to the use of the same abilities, should also be equal in other ways, with no-one being subjected to or subordinate to anyone else, unless God, the lord and master of them all, were to declare clearly and explicitly his wish that some one person be raised above the others and given an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

6. But though this is a state of liberty, it isn’t a state of licence—in which there are no constraints on how people behave. A man in that state is absolutely free to dispose of himself or his possessions, but he isn’t at liberty to destroy himself, or even to destroy any created thing in his possession unless something nobler than its mere preservation is at stake. The state of nature is governed by a law that creates obligations for everyone. And reason, which is that law, teaches anyone who takes the trouble to consult it, that because we are all equal and independent, no-one ought to harm anyone else in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. This is because we are all the work of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker; we are all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order to do his business; we are all the property of him who made us, and he made us to last as long as he chooses, not as long as we choose; we have the same abilities, and share in one common nature, so there can’t be any rank-ordering that would authorize some of us to destroy others, as if we were made to be used by one another, as the lower kinds of creatures are made to be used by us. Everyone is obliged to preserve himself and not opt out of life willfully, so for the same reason everyone ought, when his own survival isn’t at stake, to do as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind; and except when it’s a matter of punishing an offender, no-one may take away or damage anything that contributes to the preservation of someone else’s life, liberty, health, limb, or goods.

7. So that all men may be held back from invading the rights of others and from harming one another, and so that the law of nature that aims at the peace and preservation of all mankind may be obeyed, the enforcement of that law of nature (in the state of nature) is in every man’s hands, so that everyone has a right to punish law-breakers as severely as is needed to hinder the violation of the law. For the law of nature, like every law concerning men in this world, would be futile if no-one had power to enforce it and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And in the state of nature if anyone may punish someone for something bad that he has done, then everyone may do so.…

13. To this strange doctrine—of mine—namely that in the state of nature everyone has the power to enforce the law of nature, I expect this objection to be raised: It is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, because self-love will bias men in favour of themselves and their friends. And on the other side, hostility, passion and revenge will lead them to punish others too severely. So nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that is why God has—as he certainly has—established government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I freely allow that civil government is the proper remedy for the drawbacks of the state of nature. There must certainly be great disadvantages in a state where men may be judges in their own case; someone who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury will (we may well suppose) hardly be so just as to condemn himself for it! But I respond to the objector as follows: If the state of nature is intolerable because of the evils that are bound to follow from men’s being judges in their own cases, and government is to be the remedy for this, let us do a comparison. On the one side there is the state of nature; on the other there is government where one man—and remember that absolute monarchs are only men!—commands a multitude, is free to be the judge in his own case, and can do what he likes to all his subjects, with no-one being allowed to question or control those who carry out his wishes, and everyone having to put up with
whatever he does, whether he is led by reason, mistake or passion. How much better it is in the state of nature, where no man is obliged to submit to the unjust will of someone else, and someone who judges
wrongly (whether or not it is in his own case) is answerable for that to the rest of mankind!"

Excerpts from Chapter 3: The state of war

"16. The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction. So when someone declares by word or action—not in a sudden outburst of rage, but as a matter of calm settled design—that he intends to end another man's life, he puts himself into a state of war against the other person; and he thereby exposes his life to the risk of falling to the power of the other person or anyone that joins with him in his defence and takes up his quarrel. For it is reasonable and just that I should have a right to destroy anything that threatens me with destruction, because the fundamental law of nature says that men are to be preserved as much as possible, and that when not everyone can be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred. In line with this, I may destroy a man who makes war on me or has revealed himself as an enemy to my life, for the same reason that I may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no rule except that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey—dangerous creatures that will certainly destroy me if I fall into their power.

17. So it comes about that someone who tries to get another man into his absolute power thereby puts himself into a state of war with the other, for such an attempt amounts to a declaration of a plan against the life of the other man. If someone wants to get me into his power without my consent, I have reason to conclude that would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and would destroy me if he wanted to; for no one can want to have me in his absolute power unless it's to compel me by force to something that is against the right of my freedom, i.e. to make me a slave. To be sure of my own survival I must be free from such force; and reason tells me to look on him—the person who wants 7 Second Treatise John Locke 3: The state of me in his power—as an enemy to my survival, wanting to take away the freedom that is the fence to it. So someone who tries to enslave me thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. Someone wants to take away the freedom of someone else must be supposed to have a plan to take away everything else from the person, because freedom is the foundation of all the rest; and that holds in a commonwealth as well as in the state of nature.

18. This makes it lawful for me to kill a thief who hasn't done me any harm or declared any plan against my life, other than using force to get me in his power so as to take away my money or whatever else he wants. No matter what he claims he is up to, he is using force without right, to get me into his power; so I have no reason to think that he won't, when he has me in his power, take everything else away from me as well as my liberty. So it is lawful for me to treat him as someone who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. to kill him if I can; for that is the risk he ran when he started a war in which he is the aggressor.

19. This is the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war. Some men—notably Hobbes—have treated them as the same; but in fact they are as distant from one another as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation is distant from a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction. A state of nature, properly understood, involves men living together according to reason, with no-one on earth who stands above them both and has authority to judge between them. Whereas in a state of war a man uses or declares his intention to use force against another man, with no-one on earth to whom the other can appeal for relief. It is the lack of such an appeal that gives a man the right of war against an aggressor, not only in a state of nature but even if they are both subjects in a single society. If a thief has already stolen all that I am worth and is not a continuing threat to me, I may not harm him except through an appeal to the law. But if he is now setting on me to rob me—even if it's just my horse or my coat that he is after—I may kill him. There is the law, which was made for my protection, but there is no time for it to intervene to save me from losing my goods and perhaps losing my life (and if I lose that there is no reparation). Furthermore, it is the thief's fault that there is no time for an appeal to the judge that stands over him and me—namely, the law—and so I am allowed to make my own defence, and to be at war with the thief and to kill him if I can. What puts men into a state of nature is the lack of a common judge who has authority; the use of unlawful force against a man's person creates a state of war, whether or not there is a common judge and (therefore) whether or not they are in a state of nature.

20. But for men who are in a society—under a government—the state of war ends when the actual force ends; and then those on each side of the trouble should equally submit to the fair determination of the law. . . . But
in the state of nature, where there are no positive laws or judges with authority to appeal to, once a state of war has begun it continues—with the innocent party having a right to destroy the other if he can—until the
aggressor offers peace, and seeks reconciliation on terms that will make up for any wrongs he has done and will give the innocent person security from then on. What if the situation is like this? There is time and opportunity for an appeal to the law, and to legally constituted judges, but the remedy is not available because of a manifest perverting of justice, a barefaced twisting of the laws so that they protect or even reward the violence or injuries perpetrated by some men or some party of men. In such a case it is hard to think we have anything but a state of war. For wherever violence is used and injury done, even if it is done by people appointed to administer justice and is dressed up in the name, claims, or forms of law, it is still violence and injury. The purpose of the law is to protect and get compensation for the innocent, by an unbiased treatment of all who come under it; and when this is not genuinely done, war is made upon the sufferers, and they—having nowhere on earth to appeal to for justice—are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven."

Excerpts from Chapter 4: Slavery

"22. The •natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of men but to be ruled only by the law of nature. The liberty of man •in society is to be under no legislative power except the one established by consent in the commonwealth; and not under the power of any will or under restraint from any law except what is enacted by the legislature in accordance with its mandate. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us (Observations on Hobbes, Milton, etc., page 55), namely a liberty for everyone to do what he wants, live as he pleases, and not be tied by any laws. Rather, •freedom is one of two things: •Freedom of nature is being under no restraint except the law of nature. •Freedom of men under government is having a standing rule to live by, common to everyone in the society in question, and made by the legislative power that has been set up in it; a liberty to follow one’s own will in anything that isn’t forbidden by the rule, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.

23...This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to a man’s survival, so tightly tied to it, that losing it involves losing •all control over his own life. •That’s why no-one can voluntarily enter into slavery. A man doesn’t have the power to take his own life, so he can’t voluntarily enslave himself to anyone, or put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of someone else to take away his life whenever he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has; so someone who cannot take away his own life cannot give someone else such a power over it. If someone performs an act that deserves death, he has by his own fault forfeited his own life; the person to whom he has forfeited it may (when he has him in his power) delay taking it and instead make use of the offending man for his own purposes; and this isn’t doing him any wrong, because whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery to outweigh the value of his life, he has the power to resist the will of his master, thus bringing the death that he wants.

24. What I have been discussing is the condition of complete slavery, which is just a continuation of the state of war between a lawful conqueror and a captive. If they enter into any kind of pact—agreeing to limited power on the one side and obedience on the other—the state of war and slavery ceases for as long as the pact is in effect. For, as I have said, no man can by an agreement pass over to someone else something that he doesn’t himself have, namely a power over his own life. I admit that we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, cases where men sold themselves; but clearly they sold themselves only into drudgery, not slavery. It is evident that the person who was sold wasn’t thereby put at the mercy of an absolute, arbitrary, despotic power; for the master was obliged at a certain time to let the other go free from his service, and so he couldn’t at any time have the power to kill him. Indeed the master of this kind of servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his •life that he couldn’t arbitrarily even •maim him: the loss of an eye or a tooth set him free (Exodus xxi).

Excerpt from Chapter 6: Paternal power

"61. Thus we are born •free, as we are born •rational; not that we as newborn babies actually have the use of either: age that brings •reason brings •freedom with it."

Excerpts from Chapter 7: Political or Civil Society
"90. This makes it evident that absolute monarchy, which some people regard as the only genuine-government in the world, is actually inconsistent with civil society and so can’t be a form of civil government
at all! Consider what civil society is for. It is set up to avoid and remedy the drawbacks of the state of nature that inevitably follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority to which every member of that society can appeal when he has been harmed or is involved in a dispute—an authority that everyone in the society ought to obey. So any people who don’t have such an authority to appeal to for the settlement of their disputes are still in the state of nature. Thus, every absolute monarch is in the state of nature with respect to those who are under his dominion.

91. For an absolute monarch is supposed to have both legislative and executive power in himself alone; so there is no judge or court of appeal that can fairly, impartially, and authoritatively make decisions that could provide relief and compensation for any harm that may be inflicted by the monarch or on his orders. So such a man—call him Czar or Grand Seignior or what you will—is as much in the state of nature with respect to his subjects as he is with respect to the rest of mankind. This is a special case of the state of nature, because between it and the ordinary state of nature there is this difference, a woeful one for the subject (really, the slave) of an absolute monarch: in the ordinary state of nature a man is free to judge what he has a right to, and to use the best of his power to maintain his rights; whereas in an absolute monarchy, when his property is invaded by the will of his monarch, he not only has no-one to appeal to but he isn’t even free to judge what his rights are or to defend them (as though he were a cat or a dog, that can’t think for itself). He is, in short, exposed to all the misery and inconveniences that a man can fear from someone who is in the unrestrained state of nature and is also corrupted with flattery and armed with power."

Excerpts from Chapter 8: The beginning of political societies

"95. Men all being naturally free, equal, and independent, no-one can be deprived of this freedom etc. and subjected to the political power of someone else, without his own consent. The only way anyone can strip off his natural liberty and clothe himself in the bonds of civil society is for him to agree with other men to unite into a community, so as to live together comfortably, safely, and peaceably, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against outsiders. Any number of men can do this, because it does no harm to the freedom of the rest; they are left with the liberty of the state of nature, which they had all along. When any number of men have in this way consented to make one community or government, that immediately incorporates them, turns them into a single body politic in which the majority have a right to act on behalf of the rest and to bind them by its decisions.

99. So those who out of a state of nature unite into a community must be understood to give up all the powers required to secure its purposes to the majority of the community (unless they explicitly agree on some number greater than the majority). They achieve this simply by agreeing to unite into one political society; that’s all the compact that is needed between the individuals that create or join a commonwealth. Thus, what begins a political society and keeps it in existence is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. This is the only thing that did or could give a beginning to any lawful government in the world."

Excerpt from Chapter 18: Tyranny

"202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the breach of the law brings harm to someone else; and anyone in authority who exceeds the power given him by the law, using the force at his disposal to do to the subject things that aren’t allowed by the law, thereby stops being an officer of the law; and because he acts without authority he may rightly be opposed, as may any other man who by force invades the right of someone else."

Excerpts from Chapter 19: The dissolution of government

"229. The purpose of government is the good of mankind. Which is better for mankind: that the people be always exposed to the limitless will of tyranny, or that the rulers be sometimes liable to meet with opposition when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power and use it for the destruction and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

232. Anyone who uses force without right (as everyone in society does if he uses force without law) puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he uses it; and in that state all former bonds are cancelled, all other rights cease, and everyone has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor. This is
so obvious that Barclay himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is forced to admit that it is sometimes lawful for the people to resist their king; and he says it, what’s more, in a chapter in
which he offers to show that the divine law blocks the people from every kind of rebellion! In fact his own doctrine makes it clear that since the people may resist in some cases, not all resistance to monarchs is rebellion. His words are these.

240. At this point you are likely to ask: Who is to be the judge of whether the monarch or legislature have acted contrary to their trust? That they have so acted is the sort of thing that can be spread around among the people by discontented and factious men, when all the king has done is to make use of his legitimate prerogative. To this I reply, The people should be judge; for who should judge whether a trustee or deputy has acted well and according to the trust reposed in him, if not the person who deputes him? Having deputed him, he must have still a power to discard him when he fails in his trust. If this is reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in this most important case where the welfare of millions is concerned, and where the threatened evil is greater, and redressing it is very difficult, costly, and dangerous?

241. Furthermore, the question ‘Who is to be the judge?’ can’t mean that there is no judge at all; for when there is no judicature on earth to decide controversies among men, God in heaven is the judge. It is true that God alone is the judge of what is right. But every man is judge for himself, in this case as in all others, of whether another man has put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the supreme judge.

242. If a controversy arises between a king and some of the people, in a matter of great importance where the law is silent, or doubtful, I think the right umpire would be the body of the people. For in cases where the king has a trust placed in him and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law, if any private men are aggrieved and think that the king acts beyond that trust or contrary to it, the body of the people who first placed that trust in him are clearly the best judges of how far they meant the trust to extend. If that way of settling the matter is turned down by the king, or whoever is administering the government, the only court of appeal is in heaven. "What we have here is properly a state of war, in which the only appeal is to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself when it is fit for him to make such an appeal."

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Second Treatise of Government  by John Locke

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"2. Different Significations of the word Liberty. There is no word that admits of more various significations, and has made more varied impressions on the human mind, than that of liberty. Some have taken it as a means of deposing a person on whom they had conferred a tyrannical authority; others for the power of choosing a superior whom they are obliged to obey; others for the right of bearing arms, and of being thereby enabled to use violence; others, in fine, for the privilege of being governed by a native of their own country, or by their own laws.[1] A certain nation for a long time thought liberty consisted in the privilege of wearing a long beard.[2] Some have annexed this name to one form of government exclusive of others: those who had a republican taste applied it to this species of polity; those who liked a monarchical state gave it to monarchy.

[3] Thus they have all applied the name of liberty to the government most suitable to their own customs and inclinations: and as in republics the people have not so constant and so present a view of the causes of their misery, and as the magistrates seem to act only in conformity to the laws, hence liberty is generally said to reside in republics, and to be banished from monarchical. In fine, as in democracies the people seem to act almost as they please, this sort of government has been deemed the most free, and the power of the people has been confounded with their liberty.

3. In what Liberty consists. It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In governments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.

4. The same Subject continued. Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not obligate him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits.

6. Of the Constitution of England. In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state. The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people[7] at certain times of the
year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires. By this method the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being
annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate. In accusations of a deep and criminal nature, it is proper the person accused should have the privilege of choosing, in some measure, his judges, in concurrence with the law; or at least he should have a right to except against so great a number that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice. The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general will. But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society, without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations. The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers; to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of persons inclined to treat him with rigour. If the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good behaviour, there is an end of liberty; unless they are taken up, in order to answer without delay to a capital crime, in which case they are really free, being subject only to the power of the law."

Excerpts from Book XII. Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, in Relation to the Subject

"12. Of indiscreet Speeches. Nothing renders the crime of high treason more arbitrary than declaring people guilty of it for indiscreet speeches. Speech is so subject to interpretation; there is so great a difference between indiscretion and malice; and frequently so little is there of the latter in the freedom of expression, that the law can hardly subject people to a capital punishment for words unless it expressly declares what words they are.[34] Words do not constitute an overt act; they remain only in idea. When considered by themselves, they have generally no determinate signification; for this depends on the tone in which they are uttered. It often happens that in repeating the same words they have not the same meaning; this depends on their connection with other things, and sometimes more is signified by silence than by any expression whatever. Since there can be nothing so equivocal and ambiguous as all this, how is it possible to convert it into a crime of high treason? Wherever this law is established, there is an end not only of liberty, but even of its very shadow.

13. Of Writings. In writings there is something more permanent than in words, but when they are in no way preparative to high treason they cannot amount to that charge."

Excerpts from Book XV. In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Relate to the Nature of the Climate

"1. Of civil Slavery. Slavery, properly so called, is the establishment of a right which gives to one man such a power over another as renders him absolute master of his life and fortune. The state of slavery is in its own nature bad. It is neither useful to the master nor to the slave; not to the slave, because he can do nothing through a motive of virtue; nor to the master, because by having an unlimited authority over his slaves he insensibly accustoms himself to the want of all moral virtues, and thence becomes fierce, hasty, severe, choleric, voluptuous, and cruel. In despotic countries, where they are already in a state of political servitude, civil slavery is more tolerable than in other governments. Every one ought to be satisfied in those countries with necessaries and life. Hence the condition of a slave is hardly more burdensome than that of a subject. But in a monarchical government, where it is of the utmost importance that human nature should not be debased or dispirited, there ought to be no slavery. In democracies, where they are all upon equality; and in aristocracies, where the laws ought to use their utmost endeavors to procure as great an equality as the nature of the government will permit, slavery is contrary to the spirit of the constitution: it only contributes to give a power and luxury to the citizens which they ought not to have. Neither is it true that a freeman can sell himself. Sale implies a price; now when a person sells himself, his whole substance immediately devolves to his master; the master, therefore, in that case, gives nothing, and the slave receives nothing. You will say he has a peculium. But this peculium goes along with his person. If it is not lawful for a man to kill himself because he robs his country of his person, for the same reason he is not allowed to barter his freedom. The freedom of every citizen constitutes a part of the public liberty, and in a democratic state is even a part of the sovereignty. To sell one's freedom[3] is so repugnant to all reason as can scarcely be supposed in any man. If liberty may be rated with respect to the buyer, it is beyond all price to the seller. The civil law, which authorises a division of goods among men, cannot be thought to rank among such goods a part of the men
who were to make this division. The same law annuls all iniquitous contracts; surely then it affords redress in
a contract where the grievance is most enormous. The third way is birth, which falls with the two former; for
if a man could not sell himself, much less could he sell an unborn infant. If a prisoner of war is not to be reduced to slavery, much less are his children. If it be pretended that it has been beneficial to him, as his master has provided for his subsistence, slavery, at this rate, should be limited to those who are incapable of earning their livelihood. But who will take up with such slaves? As to infants, nature, who has supplied their mothers with milk, had provided for their sustenance; and the remainder of their childhood approaches so near the age in which they are most capable of being of service that he who supports them cannot be said to give them an equivalent which can entitle him to be their master. Nor is slavery less opposed to the civil law than to that of nature. What civil law can restrain a slave from running away, since he is not a member of society, and consequently has no interest in any civil institutions? He can be retained only by a family law, that is, by the master's authority. But as all men are born equal, slavery must be accounted unnatural, though in some countries it be founded on natural reason; and a wide difference ought to be made between such countries, and those in which even natural reason rejects it, as in Europe, where it has been so happily abolished."

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Book I

Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally distributed among the different Ranks of the People

Book I, Chapter I

Of the Division of Labor*16

I.1.1

The greatest improvement*17 in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.

I.1.2

The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood, by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures.

I.1.3

To take an example, therefore,*19 from a very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade).*20 nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufacutres, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.*21 I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

I.1.5

This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing,*26 is owing to three different circumstances; first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing
from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.*27
Book I, Chapter V

Of the Real and Nominal Price of Commodities, or of their Price in Labour, and their Price in Money

1.5.1

Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusements of human life. But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man’s own labour can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.

1.5.2

The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour, as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.

1.5.3

Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power; or to the quantity either of other men's labour, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other men's labour, which it enables him to purchase or command. The exchangeable value of every thing must always be precisely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner.

1.5.4

But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportion between two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different sorts of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and of ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be more labour in an hour's hard work than in two hours easy business; or in an hour's application to a trade which it cost ten years labour to learn, than in a month's industry at an ordinary and obvious employment. But it is not easy to find any accurate measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In exchanging indeed the different productions of different sorts of labour for one another, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the haggling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of common life.

1.5.5

Every commodity besides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby compared with, other commodities
than with labour. It is more natural therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of some other commodity than by that of the labour which it can purchase. The greater part of people too understand
better what is meant by a quantity of a particular commodity, than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object; the other an abstract notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.

1.5.6

But when barter ceases, and money has become the common instrument of commerce, every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than for any other commodity. The butcher seldom carries his beef or his mutton to the baker, or the brewer, in order to exchange them for bread or for beer; but he carries them to the market, where he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges that money for bread and for beer. The quantity of money which he gets for them regulates too the quantity of bread and beer which he can afterwards purchase. It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to estimate their value by the quantity of money, the commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, than by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he can exchange them only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to say that his butcher's meat is worth threepence or fourpence a pound, than that it is worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of small beer. Hence it comes to pass, that the exchangeable value of every commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange for it.

1.5.7

Gold and silver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their value, are sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. The discovery of the abundant mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been before. As it cost less labour to bring those metals from the mine to the market, so when they were brought thither they could purchase or command less labour; and this revolution in their value, though perhaps the greatest, is by no means the only one of which history gives some account. But as a measure of quantity, such as the natural foot, fathom, or handful, which is continually varying in its own quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things; so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value, can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.

1.5.8

But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be of greater and sometimes of smaller value. He purchases them sometimes with a greater and sometimes with a smaller quantity of goods, and to him the price of labour seems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to him dear in the one case, and cheap in the other. In reality, however, it is the goods which are cheap in the one case, and dear in the other.

1.5.9

In this popular sense, therefore, labour, like commodities, may be said to have a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be said to consist in the quantity of the necessaries and conveniences of life which are given for it; its nominal price, in the quantity of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in
proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour.

I.5.10
The distinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities and labour, is not a matter of mere speculation, but may sometimes be of considerable use in practice. The same real price is always of the same value; but on account of the variations in the value of gold and silver, the same nominal price is sometimes of very different values. When a landed estate, therefore, is sold with a reservation of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of importance to the family in whose favour it is reserved, that it should not consist in a particular sum of money. Its value would in this case be liable to variations of two different kinds; first, to those which arise from the different quantities of gold and silver which are contained at different times in coin of the same denomination; and, secondly, to those which arise from the different values of equal quantities of gold and silver at different times.

Book I, Chapter VII

Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities

1.7.1

There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate both of wages and profit in every different employment of labour and stock. This rate is naturally regulated, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining condition; and partly by the particular nature of each employment.

1.7.2

There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate of rent, which is regulated too, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is situated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land.

1.7.3

These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages, profit, and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail.

1.7.4

When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price.

1.7.5

The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the person who brings it to market; for though in common language what is called the prime cost of any commodity does not comprehend the profit of the person who is to sell it again, yet if he sells it at a price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the trade; since by employing his stock in some other way he might have made that profit. His profit, besides, is his revenue, the proper fund of his subsistence. As, while he is preparing and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his workmen their wages, or their subsistence; so he advances to himself, in the same manner, his own subsistence, which is generally suitable to the profit which he may reasonably expect from the sale of his goods. Unless they yield him this profit, therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be said to have really cost him.

1.7.6

Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit, is not always the lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at which he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where there is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleases.

1.7.7
The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold is called its market price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its natural price.
I.7.8
The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labour, and profit,*69 which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; since it may be sufficient to effectuate the bringing of the commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor man may be said in some sense to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never be brought to market in order to satisfy it.

I.7.9
When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin among them, and the market price will rise more or less above the natural price, according as either the greatness of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or less the eagerness of the competition. Among competitors of equal wealth and luxury the same deficiency*70 will generally occasion a more or less eager competition, according as the acquisition of the commodity happens to be of more or less importance to them.*71 Hence the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life during the blockade of a town or in a famine.

I.7.10
When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market price will sink more or less below the natural price, according as the greatness of the excess increases more or less the competition of the sellers, or according as it happens to be more or less important to them to get immediately rid of the commodity. The same excess in the importation of perishable, will occasion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.

I.7.11
When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual demand and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. The whole quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and cannot be disposed of for more. The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept of less.

I.7.12
The quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally suits itself to the effectual demand. It is the interest of all those who employ their land, labour, or stock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity never should exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interest of all other people that it never should fall short of that demand.*72

I.7.13
If at any time it exceeds the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their land; and if it is wages or profit, the interest of the labourers in the one case, and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw a part of their labour or stock from this employment. The quantity brought to market will soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will rise to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.
If, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market should at any time fall short of the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must rise above their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of all other landlords will naturally prompt them to prepare more land for the raising of this commodity; if it is wages or profit, the interest of all other labourers and dealers will soon prompt them to employ more labour and stock in preparing and bringing it to market. The quantity brought thither will soon be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will soon sink to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.

1.7.15

The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.

1.7.16

The whole quantity of industry annually employed in order to bring any commodity to market, naturally suits itself in this manner to the effectual demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precise quantity thither which may be sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, that demand.

1.7.17

But in some employments the same quantity of industry will in different years produce very different quantities of commodities;*73 while in others it will produce always the same, or very nearly the same. The same number of labourers in husbandry will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, oil, hops, &c. But the same number of spinners and weavers will every year produce the same or very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen cloth. It is only the average produce of the one species of industry which can be suited in any respect to the effectual demand; and as its actual produce is frequently much greater and frequently much less than its average produce, the quantity of the commodities brought to market will sometimes exceed a good deal, and sometimes fall short a good deal of the effectual demand. Even though that demand therefore should continue always the same, their market price will be liable to great fluctuations, will sometimes fall a good deal below, and sometimes rise a good deal above, their natural price. In the other species of industry, the produce of equal quantities of labour being always the same, or very nearly the same, it can be more exactly suited to the effectual demand. While that demand continues the same, therefore, the market price of the commodities is likely to do so too, and to be either altogether, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. That the price of linen and woollen cloth is liable neither to such frequent nor to such great variations as the price of corn, every man's experience will inform him. The price of the one species of commodities varies only with the variations in the demand: That of the other varies not only with the variations in the demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations in the quantity of what is brought to market in order to supply that demand.

1.7.18

The occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of any commodity fall chiefly upon those parts of its price which resolve themselves into wages and profit. That part which resolves itself into rent is less affected by them. A rent certain in money is not in the least affected by them either in its rate or in its value. A rent which consists either in a certain proportion or in a certain quantity of the rude produce, is no doubt affected in its yearly value by all the occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of that rude produce; but it is seldom affected by them in its yearly rate. In settling the terms of the lease, the landlord and farmer endeavour, according to their best judgment, to adjust that rate, not to the temporary and occasional, but to the average and ordinary price of the produce.

1.7.19

Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate either of wages or of profit, according as the market happens to be either over-stocked or under-stocked with commodities or with labour; with work done, or
with work to be done. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth*74 (with which the market is almost always under-stocked upon such occasions) and augments the profits of the merchants who possess any
considerable quantity of it. It has no effect upon the wages of the weavers. The market is under-stocked with commodities, not with labour; with work done, not with work to be done. It raises the wages of journeymen taylors. The market is here under-stocked with labour. There is an effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done than can be had. It sinks the price of coloured silks and cloths, and thereby reduces the profits of the merchants who have any considerable quantity of them upon hand. It sinks too the wages of the workmen employed in preparing such commodities, for which all demand is stopped for six months, perhaps for a twelvemonth. The market is here over-stocked with commodities and with labour.

I.7.20

But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this manner continually gravitating, if one may say so, towards the natural price, yet sometimes particular accidents, sometimes natural causes, and sometimes particular regulations of police, may, in many commodities, keep up the market price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural price.

I.7.21

When by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price, those who employ their stocks in supplying that market are generally careful to conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt so many new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way, that, the effectual demand being fully supplied, the market price would soon be reduced to the natural price, and perhaps for some time even below it. If the market is at a great distance from the residence of those who supply it, they may sometimes be able to keep the secret for several years together, and may so long enjoy their extraordinary profits without any new rivals. Secrets of this kind, however, it must be acknowledged, can seldom be long kept; and the extraordinary profit can last very little longer than they are kept.

I.7.22

Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than secrets in trade. A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour with materials which cost only half the price of those commonly made use of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his posterity. His extraordinary gains arise from the high price which is paid for his private labour. They properly consist in the high wages of that labour. But as they are repeated upon every part of his stock, and as their whole amount bears, upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they are commonly considered as extraordinary profits of stock.

I.7.23

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of particular accidents, of which, however, the operation may sometimes last for many years together.

I.7.24

Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to market, therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to give more than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them, together with the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock which were employed in preparing and bringing them to market, according to their natural rates. Such commodities may continue for whole centuries together to be sold at this high price; and that part of it which resolves itself into the rent of land is in this case the part which is generally paid above its natural rate. The rent of the land which affords such singular and esteemed productions, like the rent of some vineyards in France of a peculiarly happy soil and situation, bears no regular proportion to the rent of other equally fertile and equally well-cultivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed in bringing such commodities to market, on the contrary, are seldom out of their natural proportion to those of the other employments of labour and stock in their neighbourhood.
Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural causes which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully supplied, and which may continue, therefore, to operate for-ever.

I.7.26

A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.

I.7.27

The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable time altogether. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to give; The other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their business.

I.7.28

The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship*78 and all those laws which restrain, in particular employments, the competition to a smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate.

I.7.29

Such enhancements of the market price may last as long as the regulations of police which give occasion to them.

I.7.30

The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue long above, can seldom continue long below, its natural price. Whatever part of it was paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected would immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw either so much land, or so much labour, or so much stock, from being employed about it, that the quantity brought to market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would soon rise to the natural price. This at least would be the case where there was perfect liberty.*79

I.7.31

The same statutes of apprenticeship and other corporation laws indeed, which, when a manufacture is in prosperity, enable the workman to raise his wages a good deal above their natural rate, sometimes oblige him, when it decays, to let them down a good deal below it. As in the one case they exclude many people from his employment, so in the other they exclude him from many employments. The effect of such regulations, however, is not near so durable in sinking the workman's wages below, as in raising them above their natural rate. Their operation in the one way may endure for many centuries, but in the other it can last no longer than the lives of some of the workmen who were bred to the business in the time of its prosperity. When they are gone, the number of those who are afterwards educated to the trade will naturally suit itself to the effectual demand. The police must be as violent as that of Indostan or antient Egypt*80 (where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he changed it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for several generations together, sink either the wages of labour or the profits of stock below their natural rate.

I.7.32
This is all that I think necessary to be observed at present concerning the deviations, whether occasional or permanent, of the market price of commodities from the natural price.
I.7.33

The natural price itself varies with the natural rate of each of its component parts, of wages, profit, and rent; and in every society this rate varies according to their circumstances, according to their riches or poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining condition. I shall, in the four following chapters, endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, the causes of those different variations.

I.7.34

First, I shall endeavour to explain what are the circumstances which naturally determine the rate of wages, and in what manner those circumstances are affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing, stationary or declining state of the society.

I.7.35

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what are the circumstances which naturally determine the rate of profit, and in what manner too those circumstances are affected by the like variations in the state of the society.

I.7.36

Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different employments of labour and stock; yet a certain proportion seems commonly to take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different employments of labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different employments of stock. This proportion, it will appear hereafter, depends partly upon the nature of the different employments, and partly upon the different laws and policy of the society in which they are carried on. But though in many respects dependent upon the laws and policy, this proportion seems to be little affected by the riches or poverty of that society; by its advancing, stationary, or declining condition; but to remain the same or very nearly the same in all those different states. I shall, in the third place, endeavour to explain all the different circumstances which regulate this proportion.

I.7.37

In the fourth and last place, I shall endeavour to show what are the circumstances which regulate the rent of land, and which either raise or lower the real price of all the different substances which it produces.

Source:

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Supporting Question 4

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<tr>
<th>Supporting Question</th>
<th>How did the Age of Reason writers and speakers influence people to action and revolution?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Formative Performance Task</td>
<td>Develop a claim which is supported by evidence from various documents, that demonstrates how the Age of Reason writers and speakers inspired people to action and revolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Featured Sources | - **Source A**: Selected Excerpts from Common Sense by Thomas Paine from americaniclass.org  
- **Source B**: Patrick Henry: "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death"! from history.org |

At this point in the inquiry, young scholars should be thinking about what the Age of Reason writers and speakers said, and how they influenced people to action and revolution. This activity in the inquiry should take only 1 day or perhaps 1 1/2 days of class time.

Formative Performance Task

Using the sources provided in this stage of the inquiry, young scholars are required to develop a claim to be presented in various forms (scholar selection) to demonstrate how the Age of Reason writers and speakers inspired people to action and revolution. As educators, it is important to allow the young scholars to express an answer to this in innovative ways and which meets their own personalities for presentation. Being allowed to present this formative performance task creates ownership in the inquiry and is highly encouraged. Of course, all presentations are at the discretion of the teacher/performance coach in charge of this inquiry.
"III. THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS.

55 IN the following pages I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense: and have no other preliminaries to settle with the reader than that he will divest himself of prejudice and prepossession, and suffer [allow] his reason and his feelings to determine for themselves: that he will put on, or rather that he will not put off, the true character of a man, and generously enlarge his views beyond the present day.

56 Volumes have been written on the subject of the struggle between England and America. Men of all ranks have embarked in the controversy, from different motives and with various designs; but all have been ineffectual, and the period of debate is closed. Arms as the last resource decide the contest. The appeal was the choice of the king, and the continent has accepted the challenge.

58 The sun never shined on a cause of greater worth. 'Tis not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a kingdom, but of a continent—of at least one eighth part of the habitable globe. 'Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected, even to the end of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the seed time of continental union, faith and honor. The least fracture now will be like a name engraved with the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak; the wound will enlarge with the tree, and posterity read it in full grown characters.

59 By referring the matter from argument to arms, a new era for politics is struck: a new method of thinking hath arisen. All plans, proposals, &c. [etc.] prior to the nineteenth of April,12 i.e., to the commencement of hostilities, are like the almanacs of the last year which, though proper then [correct for that year], are superseded and useless now. Whatever was advanced by the advocates on either side of the question then, terminated in one and the same point, viz. a union with Great Britain; the only difference between the parties was the method of effecting it, the one proposing force, the other friendship; but it hath so far happened that the first hath failed and the second hath withdrawn her influence.

60 As much hath been said of the advantages of reconciliation, which, like an agreeable dream, hath passed away and left us as we were, it is but right that we should examine the contrary side of the argument and inquire into some of the many material injuries which these colonies sustain, and
always will sustain, by being connected with and dependent on Great Britain. To examine that
connection and dependence, on the principles of nature and common sense, to see what we have to trust to if separated, and what we are to expect if dependent.

61 I have heard it asserted by some that as America hath flourished under her former connection with Great Britain, that the same connection is necessary towards her future happiness, and will always have the same effect. Nothing can be more fallacious than this kind of argument. We may as well assert that because a child has thrived upon milk, that it is never to have meat, or that the first twenty years of our lives is to become a precedent for the next twenty. But even this is admitting more than is true; for I answer roundly that America would have flourished as much, and probably much more, had no European power had anything to do with her. The commerce by which she hath enriched herself are the necessaries of life, and will always have a market while eating is the custom of Europe.

62 But she has protected us, say some. That she hath engrossed [monopolized] us is true, and defended the continent at our expense as well as her own is admitted, and she would have defended Turkey from the same motive, viz. for the sake of trade and dominion.

63 Alas, we have been long led away by ancient prejudices and made large sacrifices to superstition. We have boasted the protection of Great Britain without considering that her motive was interest not attachment; and that she did not protect us from our enemies on our account; but from her enemies on her own account, from those who had no quarrel with us on any other account, and who will always be our enemies on the same account. Let Britain waive her pretensions [claims] to the continent, or the continent throw off the dependence, and we should be at peace with France and Spain were they at war with Britain. The miseries of Hanover last war ought to warn us against connections.13

64 It hath lately been asserted in Parliament that the colonies have no relation to each other but through the parent country, i.e., that Pennsylvania and the Jerseys, and so on for the rest, are sister colonies by the way of England. This is certainly a very roundabout way of proving relationship, but it is the nearest and only true way of proving enemyship, if I may so call it. France and Spain never were, nor perhaps ever will be, our enemies as Americans, but as our being the subjects of Great Britain.

65 But Britain is the parent country, say some. Then the more shame upon her conduct. Even brutes do not devour their young, nor savages make war upon their families;14 wherefore, the assertion, if true, turns to her reproach; but it happens not to be true, or only partly so, and the phrase parent or mother country hath been jesuitically adopted by the king and his parasites with a low papistical
design of gaining an unfair bias on the credulous weakness of our minds.15 Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America. This new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted
lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe. Hither have they fled, not from the
tender embraces of the mother, but from the cruelty of the monster; and it is so far true of England
that the same tyranny which drove the first emigrants from home pursues their descendants still.
68 But, admitting [assuming] that we were all of English descent, what does it amount to? Nothing.
Britain, being now an open enemy, extinguishes every other name and title: and to say that
reconciliation is our duty is truly farcical. The first king of England of the present line (William the
Conqueror) was a Frenchman, and half the Peers of England are descendants from the same
country; wherefore, by the same method of reasoning, England ought to be governed by France.
71 I challenge the warmest advocate for reconciliation to show a single advantage that this continent
can reap by being connected with Great Britain. I repeat the challenge: not a single advantage is
derived. Our corn will fetch its price in any market in Europe, and our imported goods must be paid
for, buy them where we will.
72 But the injuries and disadvantages we sustain by that connection are without number, and our
duty to mankind at large, as well as to ourselves, instruct us to renounce the alliance, because any
submission to, or dependence on, Great Britain, tends directly to involve this continent in European
wars and quarrels, and sets us at variance with nations who would otherwise seek our friendship,
and against whom we have neither anger nor complaint. As Europe is our market for trade, we
ought to form no partial connection with any part of it. It is the true interest of America to steer
clear of European contentions, which she never can do, while, by her dependence on Britain, she is
made the makeweight16 in the scale of British politics.
73 Europe is too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long at peace, and whenever a war breaks out
between England and any foreign power, the trade of America goes to ruin, because of her connection
with Britain. The next war may not turn out like the last, and should it not, the advocates for
reconciliation now will be wishing for separation then, because neutrality in that case would be a safer
convoy than a man of war [warship]. Everything that is right or natural pleads for separation. The blood
of the slain, the weeping voice of nature cries, 'TIS TIME TO PART. Even the distance at which the
Almighty hath placed England and America is a strong and natural proof that the authority of the
one over the other was never the design of Heaven. The time likewise at which the continent was
discovered adds weight to the argument, and the manner in which it was peopled, increases the force of
it. The [Protestant] Reformation was preceded by the discovery of America, as if the Almighty graciously
meant to open a sanctuary to the persecuted in future years, when home should afford neither friendship
nor safety.

74 The authority of Great Britain over this continent is a form of government which sooner or later
must have an end, and a serious mind can draw no true pleasure by looking forward, under the painful and positive conviction that what he calls "the present constitution" is merely temporary. As parents, we can have no joy knowing that this government is not sufficiently lasting to ensure anything which we may bequeath to posterity [future generations]. And by a plain method of argument, as we are running the next generation into debt, we ought to do the work of it, otherwise we use them meanly and pitifully. In order to discover the line of our duty rightly, we should take our children in our hand and fix our station a few years farther into life. That eminence [perspective] will present a prospect which a few present fears and prejudices conceal from our sight.

75 Though I would carefully avoid giving unnecessary offense, yet I am inclined to believe that all those who espouse the doctrine of reconciliation may be included within the following descriptions. Interested men, who are not to be trusted; weak men who cannot see; prejudiced men who will not see; and a certain set of moderate men who think better of the European world than it deserves; and this last class, by an ill-judged deliberation, will be the cause of more calamities to this continent than all the other three.

76 It is the good fortune of many to live distant from the scene of present sorrow. The evil is not sufficiently brought to their doors to make them feel the precariousness with which all American property is possessed. But let our imaginations transport us a few moments to Boston, that seat of wretchedness will teach us wisdom and instruct us forever to renounce a power in whom we can have no trust. The inhabitants of that unfortunate city who, but a few months ago were in ease and affluence, have now no other alternative than to stay and starve, or turn out to beg. Endangered by the fire of their [Patriot] friends if they continue within the city, and plundered by the [British] soldiery if they leave it, in their present condition they are prisoners without the hope of redemption, and in a general attack for their relief they would be exposed to the fury of both armies.

77 Men of passive tempers look somewhat lightly over the offenses of Britain, and, still hoping for the best, are apt to call out, "Come, come, we shall be friends again for all this." But examine the passions and feelings of mankind. Bring the doctrine of reconciliation to the touchstone [test] of nature, and then tell me whether you can hereafter love, honor, and faithfully serve the power that hath carried fire and sword into your land. If you cannot do all these, then are you only deceiving yourselves, and by your delay bringing ruin upon posterity? Your future connection with Britain, whom you can neither love nor honor, will be forced and unnatural, and being formed only on the plan of present convenience, will in a little time fall into a relapse more wretched than the first. But if
you say you can still pass the violations over, then I ask, Hath your house been burnt? Hath your property been destroyed before your face? Are your wife and children destitute of a bed to lie on or
bread to live on? Have you lost a parent or a child by their hands, and yourself the ruined and wretched survivor? If you have not, then are you not a judge of those who have? But if you have, and still can shake hands with the murderers, then are you unworthy the name of husband, father, friend, or lover, and whatever may be your rank or title in life, you have the heart of a coward and the spirit of a sycophant.19

78 This is not inflaming or exaggerating matters, but trying them by those feelings and affections which nature justifies, and without which we should be incapable of discharging the social duties of life or enjoying the felicities of it. I mean not to exhibit horror for the purpose of provoking revenge, but to awaken us from fatal and unmanly slumbers, that we may pursue determinately some fixed object. It is not in the power of Britain or of Europe to conquer America, if she do not conquer herself by delay and timidity. The present winter is worth an age if rightly employed, but if lost or neglected the whole continent will partake of the misfortune; and there is no punishment which that man will not deserve, be he who, or what, or where he will, that may be the means of sacrificing a season so precious and useful.

79 It is repugnant to reason, to the universal order of things, to all examples from former ages, to suppose that this continent can long remain subject to any external power. The most sanguine [optimistic] in Britain does not think so. The utmost stretch of human wisdom cannot, at this time, compass a plan, short of separation, which can promise the continent even a year’s security. Reconciliation is now a fallacious dream. Nature hath deserted the connection, and Art cannot supply her place. For, as Milton wisely expresses, “never can true reconcilement grow where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep.”20

80 Every quiet method for peace hath been ineffectual. Our prayers have been rejected with disdain, and only tended to convince us that nothing flatters vanity or confirms obstinacy in Kings more than repeated petitioning—and nothing hath contributed more than that very measure to make the Kings of Europe absolute. Witness Denmark and Sweden. Wherefore, since nothing but blows will do, for God’s sake let us come to a final separation, and not leave the next generation to be cutting throats under the violated unmeaning names of parent and child.

84 I am not induced by motives of pride, [political] party, or resentment to espouse the doctrine of separation and independence. I am clearly, positively, and conscientiously persuaded that it is the true interest of this continent to be so; that everything short of that is mere patchwork, that it can afford no lasting felicity—that it is leaving the sword to our children, and shrinking back at a time
when a little more, a little further, would have rendered this continent the glory of the earth.

85 As Britain hath not manifested the least inclination towards a compromise, we may be assured
that no terms can be obtained worthy the acceptance of the continent, or any ways equal to the expense of blood and treasure we have been already put to.

86 The object contended for ought always to bear some just proportion to the expense. The removal of North or the whole detestable Junto21 is a matter unworthy the millions we have expended. A temporary stoppage of trade was an inconvenience which would have sufficiently balanced the repeal of all the acts complained of, had such repeals been obtained; but if the whole continent must take up arms, if every man must be a soldier, it is scarcely worth our while to fight against a contemptible ministry [king’s cabinet/advisers] only. Dearly, dearly, do we pay for the repeal of the acts, if that is all we fight for; for, in a just estimation it is as great a folly to pay a Bunker Hill price for law as for land.22 As I have always considered the independence of this continent as an event which sooner or later must arrive, so from the late rapid progress of the Continent to maturity, the event could not be far off. Wherefore, on the breaking out of hostilities, it was not worth the while to have disputed a matter which time would have finally redressed, unless we meant to be in earnest. Otherwise it is like wasting an estate on a suit at law, to regulate the trespasses of a tenant whose lease is just expiring. No man was a warmer wisher for a reconciliation than myself before the fatal nineteenth of April 1775,* but the moment the event of that day was made known, I rejected the hardened, sullen-tempered Pharaoh of England forever; and disdain the wretch, that with the pretended title of FATHER OF HIS PEOPLE can unfeelingly hear of their slaughter, and composedly sleep with their blood upon his soul.

87 But admitting that matters were now made up, what would be the event?23 I answer, the ruin of the continent. And that for several reasons.

88 First. The powers of governing still remaining in the hands of the king, he will have a negative24 over the whole legislation of this continent. And as he hath shown himself such an inveterate enemy to liberty, and discovered such a thirst for arbitrary power, is he, or is he not, a proper man to say to these colonies, “You shall make no laws but what I please.” And is there any inhabitant of America so ignorant as not to know that according to what is called the present constitution, this continent can make no laws but what the king gives leave to [permits]; and is there any man so unwise as not to see that (considering what has happened) he will suffer [permit] no law to be made here but such as suits his purpose. We may be as effectually enslaved by the want [lack] of laws in America as by submitting to laws made for us in England. After matters are made up (as it is called), can there be any doubt but the whole power of the crown will be exerted to keep this continent as low and
humble as possible? Instead of going forward we shall go backward, or be perpetually quarrelling or ridiculously petitioning.—We are already greater than the king wishes us to be, and will he not
hereafter endeavor to make us less? To bring the matter to one point, Is the power who is jealous of our prosperity a proper power to govern us? Whoever says No to this question is an independent, for independence means no more than this, whether we shall make our own laws or whether the king, the greatest enemy this continent hath or can have, shall tell us “there shall be no laws but such as I like.

91 Secondly. That as even the best terms which we can expect to obtain can amount to no more than a temporary expedient, or a kind of government by guardianship, which can last no longer than till the colonies come of age, so the general face and state of things in the interim will be unsettled and unpromising. Emigrants of property [wealth] will not choose to come to a country whose form of government hangs but by a thread, and who is every day tottering on the brink of commotion and disturbance; and numbers of the present inhabitants would lay hold of the interval to dispose of their effects [possessions] and quit [leave] the Continent.

92 But the most powerful of all arguments is that nothing but independence, i.e., a continental form of government, can keep the peace of the continent and preserve it inviolate from civil wars. I dread the event of a reconciliation with Britain now, as it is more than probable that it will be followed by a revolt somewhere or other, the consequences of which may be far more fatal than all the malice of Britain.

96 If there is any true cause of fear respecting independence, it is because no plan is yet laid down. Men do not see their way out.—Wherefore as an opening into that business, I offer the following hints, at the same time modestly affirming that I have no other opinion of them myself than that they may be the means of giving rise to something better. Could the straggling thoughts of individuals be collected, they would frequently form materials for wise and able men to improve into useful matter.

97 LET the assemblies be annual, with a President only: the representation more equal, their business wholly domestic and subject to the authority of a Continental Congress.

98 Let each colony be divided into six, eight, or ten convenient districts, each district to send a proper number of delegates to Congress, so that each colony send at least thirty, the whole number in Congress will be at least 390; each Congress to sit26 and to choose a president by the following method. When the delegates are met, let a colony be taken from the whole thirteen colonies by lot, after which let the Congress choose (by ballot) a president from out of the delegates of that province. In the next Congress, let a colony be taken by lot from twelve only, omitting that colony from which the president was taken in the former Congress, and so proceeding on till the
whole thirteen shall have had their proper rotation. And in order that nothing may pass into a law but what is satisfactorily just, not less than three fifths of the Congress to be called a majority.—He
that will promote discord under a government so equally formed as this would have joined Lucifer
in his revolt.

103 But where, say some, is the King of America? I’ll tell you, friend, he reigns above, and doth not
make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Great Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be
defective even in earthly honors, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be
brought forth placed on the divine law, the word of God. Let a crown be placed thereon, by which
the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in
absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be
no other. But lest any ill use should afterwards arise, let the crown at the conclusion of the ceremony
be demolished, and scattered among the people whose right it is.

104 A government of our own is our natural right, and when a man seriously reflects on the
precariousness of human affairs, he will become convinced that it is infinitely wiser and safer to
form a constitution of our own in a cool deliberate manner, while we have it in our power, than to
trust such an interesting event to time and chance.

105 To talk of friendship with those in whom our reason forbids us to have faith, and our affections
wounded through a thousand pores instruct us to detest, is madness and folly. Every day wears out
the little remains of kindred between us and them; and can there be any reason to hope that, as the
relationship expires, the affection will increase, or that we shall agree better when we have ten
times more and greater concerns to quarrel over than ever?

106 Ye that tell us of harmony and reconciliation, can ye restore to us the time that is past? Can ye
give to prostitution its former innocence? Neither can ye reconcile Britain and America. The last
cord now is broken, the people of England are presenting addresses against us. There are injuries
which nature cannot forgive; she would cease to be nature if she did. As well can the lover forgive
the ravisher of his mistress, as the continent forgive the murders of Britain. The Almighty hath
implanted in us these unextinguishable feelings for good and wise purposes. They are the guardians
of his image in our hearts. They distinguish us from the herd of common animals. The social
compact would dissolve, and justice be extirpated [removed] from the earth, or have only a casual
existence were we callous to the touches of affection. The robber and the murderer would often
escape unpunished, did not the injuries which our tempers sustain provoke us into justice.

107 O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose not only the tyranny but the tyrant, stand forth! Every
spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia and
Africa have long expelled her.—Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning To depart. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.
IV. Of the present ABILITY OF AMERICA, with some miscellaneous REFLECTIONS.

123 In almost every article of defense we abound. Hemp flourishes even to rankness, so that we need not want [lack] cordage. Our iron is superior to that of other countries. Our small arms equal to any in the world. Cannon we can cast at pleasure. Saltpetre and gunpowder we are every day producing. Our knowledge is hourly improving. Resolution is our inherent character, and courage hath never yet forsaken us. Wherefore, what is it that we want [lack/need]? Why is it that we hesitate? From Britain we can expect nothing but ruin. If she is once admitted to the government of America again, this Continent will not be worth living in. Jealousies will be always arising; insurrections will be constantly happening; and who will go forth to quell them? Who will venture his life to reduce his own countrymen to a foreign obedience? The difference between Pennsylvania and Connecticut, respecting some unlocated lands, shows the insignificance of a British government, and fully proves that nothing but Continental authority can regulate Continental matters.

125 The infant state of the Colonies, as it is called, so far from being against, is an argument in favor of independence.

126 Youth is the seed time of good habits, as well in nations as in individuals. It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the Continent into one Government half a century hence.

134 TO CONCLUDE, however strange it may appear to some, or however unwilling they may be to think so, matters not, but many strong and striking reasons may be given to show that nothing can settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined declaration for independence.

140 These proceedings may at first seem strange and difficult, but, like all other steps which we have already passed over, will in a little time become familiar and agreeable; and until an independence is declared, the Continent will feel itself like a man who continues putting off some unpleasant business from day to day, yet knows it must be done, hates to set about it, wishes it over, and is continually haunted with the thoughts of its necessity."

Source:
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St. John’s Church, Richmond, Virginia

MR. PRESIDENT: No man thinks more highly than I do of the patriotism, as well as abilities, of the very worthy gentlemen who have just addressed the House. But different men often see the same subject in different lights; and, therefore, I hope it will not be thought disrespectful to those gentlemen if, entertaining as I do, opinions of a character very opposite to theirs, I shall speak forth my sentiments freely, and without reserve. This is no time for ceremony. The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth, and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offence, I should consider myself as guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty toward the majesty of heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings.

Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and, having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.

I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided; and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging of the future but by the past. And judging by the past, I wish to know what there has been in the conduct of the British ministry for the last ten years, to justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to solace themselves, and the House? Is it that insidious smile with which our petition has been lately received? Trust it not, sir; it will prove a snare to your feet. Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss. Ask yourselves how this gracious reception of our petition comports with these war-like preparations which cover our waters and darken our land. Are fleets and armies necessary to a work of love and reconciliation? Have we shown ourselves so unwilling to be reconciled, that force must be called in to win back our love? Let us not deceive ourselves, sir. These are the implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort. I ask, gentlemen, sir, what means this martial array, if its purpose be not to force us to submission? Can gentlemen assign any other possible motive for it? Has Great Britain any enemy, in this quarter of the world, to call for all this accumulation of navies and armies? No, sir, she has none. They are meant for us; they can be meant for no other. They are sent over to bind and rivet upon us those chains which the British ministry have been so long forging. And what have we to oppose to them? Shall we try argument? Sir, we have been trying that for the last ten years. Have we anything new to offer upon the subject? Nothing. We have held the subject up in every light of which it is capable; but it has been all in vain. Shall we resort to entreaty and humble supplication? What terms shall we find which have not been already exhausted? Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves. Sir, we have done everything that could be done, to avert the storm which is now coming on. We have petitioned; we have remonstrated; we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored the interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned, with contempt, from the foot of the throne. In vain, after these things, may we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If we wish to be free if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained, we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight! An appeal to arms and to the God of Hosts is all that is left us!
They tell us, sir, that we are weak; unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a
British guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance, by lying supinely on our backs, and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot? Sir, we are not weak if we make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. Three millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations; and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come.

It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace²but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!

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### Argument

After having completely learned about the Enlightenment, the American/French Revolutions, and done intensive analysis of the writings provided in this inquiry and all of the formative performance tasks, young scholars will be able to answer the compelling question which was at the root of this whole inquiry. The argument can be expressed at teacher/performance coach discretion, but is best expressed in the form of a mini paper in a style conducive to what your young scholars will experience their first year in college/university. Two suggestions are MLA, APA, and/or Turabian (especially used by history professors in college/university). The more experience your young scholars get doing papers, the easier it will be for them in college/university. This exercise will facilitate that process. This part of the inquiry may take 2 to 3 days because of the makeup of the summative performance task. If more time is needed, then certainly one more day to finalize their summative performance task should be enough time.

### Extension

For the more technological young scholars, this extension was created because the youth of today are more centered on social media as compared to the youth of even just a few years ago. Some of your young scholars may actually prefer this extension to doing the formal paper, but the importance of doing a formal paper is too valuable as an experience to substitute this activity for the summative performance task. This extension was created as an effort for young scholars to have fun with social media and actually do something important rather than some of the more mundane things they come up with to comment on.
Active involvement in our political processes and expressing own’s views on important matters is a common virtue of Americans. This action activity requires scholars to become actively involved through an avenue which can be read by others and encourage courageous conversations among members of society and young scholars in general. There may be other mediums that the teacher/performance coach can come up with that may rival a newspaper, but the intent is to drive conversations at the local and state level. If there is another medium that can do that easier and reach a wider audience, then that certainly is encouraged.